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Article 4

The Core of an Unqualified Case for
Judicial Review
A REPLY TO JEREMY WALDRON AND
CONTEMPORARY CRITICS
Alexander Kaufman† & Michael B. Runnels††
INTRODUCTION
Should courts in free and democratic societies possess
“the authority to strike down legislation when they are
convinced that it violates individual rights”?1 The practice of
judicial review assigns such authority to the courts, and thus
removes many fundamental political issues from the control of
the democratically elected legislature. Advocates of judicial
review argue that the protection of individual rights through
judicial review is necessary in order to make possible the goal
of self-government that motivates democratic theory. The defining
quality of democratic government—according to such leading
theorists as Ronald Dworkin, Joshua Cohen, and Cécile Fabre—is
not unconditional fidelity to the preferences of the majority, but
rather the joint and equal participation of citizens in the process
of self-government.2 According to these theorists, democracy is
† Associate Professor of Political Theory, School of Public and International
Affairs, University of Georgia; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1983; M.P.P., Kennedy
School of Government, 1990; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1996.
†† Associate Professor of Law & Social Responsibility, Sellinger School of
Business and Management, Loyola University, Maryland; J.D., Fordham Law School, 2007.
1 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006) [hereinafter Waldron, The Core of the Case].
2 See
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82–90 (1977)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY] (arguing that judicial decisions in
civil cases should be determined by considerations of principle (which respect rights),
not considerations of policy (which weigh consequences)); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation
and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND
POLITICS 68–70 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) [hereinafter Cohen,
Deliberation] (arguing that the protection of rights is justified by “notions of autonomy
and the common good,” and not by the consequences produced); Cécile Fabre, A
Philosophical Argument for a Bill of Rights, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 77, 79, 91 (2000)
[hereinafter Fabre, A Philosophical Argument] (arguing that constitutional rights should
be enforced by the judiciary because they are moral rights against the state, not because
the judiciary is more likely to protect these rights); Cécile Fabre, Constitutionalising
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realized only when each member of society participates on
equal terms in the construction of shared political institutions
and policies. Members of society may enjoy the right to
participate in this fashion, they argue, only if the power of the
majority is limited to ensure that political power is exercised in
a manner ensuring respect for individual rights. Only institutions
that guarantee respect for rights in this manner, it is argued, in
fact secure conditions within which each member of society
participates on equal terms. Judicial review is thus required in
order to limit the power of the majority in a manner that makes
democratic self-government possible.
These arguments in favor of judicial review have been
disputed by recent work in legal theory, in particular the
writings of James Allan, Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione,
James Tully, and Jeremy Waldron.3 These theorists argue that
vesting the courts with the authority to strike down legislation
enacted by a representative legislature is inconsistent with the
democratic idea of government by the people. Additionally,
these theorists argue that democracies should assign the power
to resolve questions regarding the nature and extent of individual
rights to the majority of citizens and their representatives.
According to this view, the institutional features of a
constitutional democracy—including judicial review and
supermajority provisions—that remove such questions from the
public agenda are disrespectful to citizens who would prefer to
enact legislation that is forbidden or prevented by institutional
constraints on the will of the majority.

Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263, 266 (1998) [hereinafter Fabre, Constitutionalising]
(arguing that any consequentialist argument for protecting constitutional rights “must
ultimately appeal to moral [that is, non-consequentialist] considerations”).
3 See RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN
DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007) [hereinafter BELLAMY,
CONSTITUTIONALISM] (questioning the effectiveness and legitimacy of judicial review as
a supplement to democracy); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY (1995) (arguing
that entrenched rights must be modifiable through political action by the majority to
reflect cultural diversity); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 209–312 (1999)
[hereinafter WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT]; James Allan, Bills of Rights and
Judicial Power—A Liberal’s Quandary, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 352 (1996)
(arguing that the values that justify respect for rights also justify the rejection of
entrenched rights); Richard Bellamy, The Political Form of the Constitution: The
Separation of Powers, Rights, and Representative Democracy, 44 POL. STUD. 436, 456
(1996) [hereinafter Bellamy, Political Form] (arguing that modern democratic societies
improperly privilege respect for rights over respect for the will of the majority); Richard
Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Constitutionalism and Democracy—Political Theory and
the American Constitution, 27 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 595, 617–18 (1997) (arguing that rights
protections in a democracy must ultimately be subject to the will of the majority);
Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 18, 51 (1993) [hereinafter Waldron, A Right-Based Critique].
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Jeremy Waldron presents a particularly powerful account
of these arguments against judicial review in his influential piece:
The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review.4 His article
arguably presents the most significant challenge to judicial
review that has appeared in the recent legal literature.5 As the
title of his article suggests, Waldron argues that courts in a
democratic society cannot legitimately claim authority under
that society’s constitution to strike down legislation enacted by
a democratically elected legislature on the grounds that the
legislation violates rights. He asserts that in a democracy, only
the elected representatives of the people can legitimately
resolve disagreements regarding the nature and extent of
individual rights.6
In The Core of the Case, Waldron argues that the most
fundamental commitment of a democracy is, “the imperative that
one be treated as an equal so far as a society’s decisionmaking is
concerned,”7 and this commitment applies with maximum force
to the “intractable, controversial, and profound questions”8
regarding the nature and extent of rights protections. Is a fetus
a person with a right to life? Is flag burning a protected form of
political speech? Does a terminally ill person have the right to
end his or her life? According to Waldron, these issues are too
substantial and controversial to be removed from the jurisdiction
of democratic politics.9 In a democracy, according to Waldron’s
See Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1.
Waldron’s arguments have stimulated responses from many leading legal
scholars, including the following: COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE
SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (2007) [hereinafter BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS]; MICHAEL J. PERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY, AND THE
SUPREME COURT (2009); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008);
Corey Brettschneider, Popular Constitutionalism and the Case for Judicial Review, 34
POL. THEORY 516 (2006) [hereinafter Brettschneider, Popular Constitutionalism];
Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, Essay, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991
(2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2009)
[hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Constraints]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an
Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2008) [hereinafter
Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy Case]; Annabelle Lever, Democracy and Judicial Review:
Are They Really Incompatible?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 805 (2009) [hereinafter Lever, Democracy
and Judicial Review]; Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286 (2012);
Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61 (2008).
6 Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1390–91; see WALDRON,
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 211–54.
7 Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1375.
8 Id. at 1350 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 74 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]).
4

5

9 When citizens or their representatives disagree about what rights we
have or what those rights entail, it seems something of an insult to say that
this is not something they are to be permitted to sort out by majoritarian
processes, but that the issue is to be assigned instead for final determination
to a small group of judges.
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view, such issues can only be resolved through the
deliberations of the people’s elected representatives.10
As should be readily apparent, Waldron’s case against
judicial review is actually a case against the constitutional
protection of rights. He argues not that courts function
improperly under existing constitutional arrangements,11 but
rather that the existing arrangements are inconsistent with the
central commitments of a democratic society. Waldron concedes
that the argument presented in his article merely expands and
develops a critique of the constitutional protection of rights that
he has presented continuously over the last twenty-two years.12
These writings have inspired a significant body of work by
scholars such as James Allan, Richard Bellamy, Dario
Castiglione, and James Tully,13 all of whom develop arguments
that support the thesis that the constitutional entrenchment of
rights14 is inconsistent with democracy. The critique of rights
theory advanced in these works, known as the “majoritarian
critique,” argues that democracies should assign the power to
resolve questions regarding the nature and extent of
individual rights to the people’s elected representatives and
not to the judiciary.
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 15; see Waldron, The Core of
the Case, supra note 1, at 1348–50.
10 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 10–17, 211–14,
221–23, 243–52.
11 Such arrangements are those within which citizens enjoy the benefit of
constitutionally entrenched rights (e.g., freedom of speech, due process, equal protection
under the law)—rights that protect citizens against invasion by the majority of the
fundamental interests protected by these rights.
12 In A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, he argues that
entrenched constitutional rights are inconsistent with the notion of respect for persons,
which is implicit in the idea of the person as a bearer of rights. Waldron, A Right-Based
Critique, supra note 3, at 19–20. In The Dignity of Legislation, Waldron argues that the
legislature is a forum that is not less worthy to resolve the “most serious issues of
human rights that a modern society confronts” than courts “with their wigs and
ceremonies.” JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 4–5 (1999) [hereinafter
WALDRON, DIGNITY]. In his book Law and Disagreement, he argues that the majority
most legitimately resolves disagreements regarding the nature and extent of rights
guarantees through a democratic political process. WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT,
supra note 3, at 15.
13 See, e.g., BELLAMY, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 3, at 26–48 (questioning
the effectiveness and legitimacy of judicial review as a supplement to democracy); TULLY,
supra note 3, at 58–212 (arguing that entrenched rights should be modifiable through
political action by the majority); Allan, supra note 3, at 352 (arguing that the values
that justify respect for rights also justify the rejection of entrenched rights); Bellamy,
Political Form, supra note 3, at 452–55 (questioning the assumption that judicial
review is necessary to protect the fundamental rights of citizens in a constitutional
democracy); Bellamy & Castiglione, supra note 3, at 612–18 (arguing that rights
protections in a democracy must ultimately be subject to the will of the majority).
14 A right is constitutionally entrenched if the constitution requires that the
provision containing the rights protection cannot be amended by a simple majority vote.
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In The Core of the Case, Waldron focuses on the most
abstract elements of this argument.15 His purpose in presenting
his case in this manner is to identify “a core argument against
judicial review that is independent of both its historical
manifestations and questions about its particular effects.”16
Waldron suggests that focusing on the argument at this level of
abstraction reveals that advocates of judicial review have
underestimated the complexity of the issues involved and have,
therefore, neglected important considerations—particularly the
effects of rights guarantees on the rights of individual citizens
to influence policy decisions. These advocates, he suggests,
stress the importance of “ensur[ing] the appropriate outcome,”17
because “if the wrong answer is given [regarding questions of
principle], then rights will be violated.”18 Waldron goes on to
argue that theorists who make such arguments pay “insufficient
attention to the point that although outcome-related reasons are
very important in . . . decisionmaking about rights, reasons of
other kinds may be important too.”19 In particular, Waldron
stresses the “process-related” concern that disagreements about
rights in a democracy must be resolved through a procedure that
respects “the right to have one’s voice counted.”20 The theorists
who privilege outcome-related reasons neglect this equally
fundamental concern, Waldron argues, by employing a narrowed
focus on getting questions of principle right.
It is clear, even in this brief summary, that Waldron’s
argument relies upon a surprising and controversial assumption:
that advocates of judicial review base their arguments on the
claim that judicial review is necessary in order to ensure
appropriate outcomes or consequences—that is, in order to
ensure consequences that are more just. Waldron, in other words,
relies on the assumption that his philosophical opponents are
“consequentialists,”21 and this central assumption is hereinafter
referred to as the “consequentialist assumption.” Strikingly,
15 Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1351–52. He states that his
aim is “to take off some of the flesh and boil down the normative argument to its bare
bones . . . . [to] set[] out the core case against judicial review in abstraction from its
particular consequences.” Id.
16 Id. at 1351.
17 Id. at 1373.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1374.
20 Id. at 1373.
21 Consequentialism is an approach to ethics that judges the moral value of
an action or event entirely by its consequences. According to consequentialism, the
morally right action is the one with the best overall consequences. See generally
CONSEQUENTIALISM (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003) (presenting classic and contemporary
texts examining and justifying consequentialism).
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Waldron’s leading philosophical opponents in this debate—
most notably Joshua Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Cécile Fabre,
and Stephen Holmes—are noted for their rejection of
consequentialist arguments.22 The most persuasive arguments for
judicial review are, as this article discusses below, the product of
an important strand of democratic theory that stresses the
constitutive role of rights in defining and enabling democratic
institutions.23
This
theory—better
known
as
the
constitutionalist view—holds that democracy involves more
than the mere satisfaction of the preferences of the majority.
Rather, democracy is a form of self-government by a people
that only exists when the power of the majority is limited to
ensure that political power is exercised in a manner reflecting
equal concern and respect for the interests of each member of
society.24 Therefore, the constitutionalist view concludes that the
courts perform a role essential to the maintenance of healthy
democracy when they implement rights protections through
judicial review.25 Since Waldron’s philosophical opponents are
noted for their rejection of consequentialism, Waldron’s assertion
22 See Cohen, Deliberation, supra note 2 (arguing that the protection of rights
is justified by “notions of autonomy and the common good,” and not by the
consequences produced); DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 82–90
(arguing that judicial decisions in civil cases should be determined by considerations of
principle (which respect rights), not considerations of policy (which weigh consequences));
Fabre, Constitutionalising, supra note 2 (arguing that any consequentialist argument for
protecting constitutional rights “must ultimately appeal to moral [that is, nonconsequentialist] considerations”); Fabre, A Philosophical Argument, supra note 2
(arguing that constitutional rights should be enforced by the judiciary because they are
moral rights against the state, not because the judiciary is more likely to protect these
rights); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 27 (1995) (arguing that liberal constitutionalism “is a norm-based, not an
interest-based, theory”).
23 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 266–78;
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 3–38; Stephen Holmes, Precommitment
and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 240 (Jon
Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Democracy].
24 See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 3–31; HOLMES, supra note
22, at 27–36; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 200–06 (1971); Cohen, Democracy,
supra note 23, at 185; Fabre, A Philosophical Argument, supra note 2, at 95–98.
25 See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 3–31 (arguing that
“[d]emocracy means government subject to conditions,” id. at 17, and that judicial
review in democratic societies thus provides the basis for a superior form of republican
deliberation and democratic government, id. at 29–31); HOLMES, supra note 22, at 27–
36 (arguing that the enforcement of limits on the power of electoral majorities are
democracy-reinforcing); RAWLS, supra note 24, at 200–06 (arguing that the enforcement
of constitutionalized restrictions on the will of the majority is necessary to ensure the
justice of democratic institutions); Cohen, Democracy, supra note 23, at 185 (arguing that
the enforcement of rights protections constitutes an element of democracy rather than a
constraint on it); Fabre, A Philosophical Argument, supra note 2, at 95–98 (arguing that
judicial enforcement of rights guarantees by striking down legislation that violates
fundamental rights is essential in order for a set of institutions to count as a democracy).
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that his philosophical opponents rely upon consequentialist
reasoning requires careful examination, particularly since this
assertion has significantly influenced recent contributors to the
debate over judicial review.26
While Waldron argues that advocates of judicial review
neglect important considerations, his own presentation in The
Core of the Case is surprisingly inattentive to the constitutionalist
arguments offered by Dworkin, Cohen, Fabre, Holmes, and
others.27 Waldron can hardly deny the centrality and significance
of the constitutionalist view of democracy—a view that stresses
the constitutive role of rights in democratic forms of society—
since he devotes approximately one third of his most recent book
on rights theory28 to responses to objections that the view raises.
Why, then, does Waldron virtually ignore issues raised by the
constitutionalist argument in The Core of the Case? The short
answer is that he stipulates the following assumption at the
outset that eliminates the need to discuss the constitutive role of
rights: “[G]eneral respect for individual and minority rights is a
serious part of a broad consensus in the society.”29 In other words,
one should assume that the vast majority of members of society
“keep their own and others’ views on rights under constant
consideration . . .[and] are alert to issues of rights in regard to all
the social decisions that are . . . discussed in their midst.”30
Certainly, one would have less reason to view the
constitutional protection of rights as an essential feature of a
democratic political institution if one could confidently assume—
as Waldron has—that most members of most societies were
profoundly committed to respect for individual and minority
rights. However, Waldron’s assumption is both extremely
optimistic and highly implausible.31 Moreover, in making this
26 See generally BELLAMY, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 3, at 90–100
(arguing that Dworkin cannot justify his alleged claim that court resolutions of
questions regarding rights produce the best “‘results’ at promoting democratic rights,”
id. at 93); Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy Case, supra note 5; Lever, Democracy and
Judicial Review, supra note 5.
27 See generally DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8 (arguing that the
judicial enforcement of entrenched rights is an essential institutional feature of a
healthy democratic society); HOLMES, supra note 22 (arguing that entrenched rights
perform an essential structural role in democratic forms of government); Cohen,
Deliberation, supra note 2 (arguing that entrenched rights guarantees are an essential
feature of democratic government, properly construed); Fabre, A Philosophical
Argument, supra note 2 (arguing that the entrenchment of rights is essential for the
legitimacy of democratic forms of government).
28 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 190–312.
29 Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1365.
30 Id.
31 Modern history is replete with instances in which this assumption has
proven to be catastrophically false. Recent examples of genocide from Bosnia, Rwanda,
and Darfur, for example, exemplify the predatory pursuit of group interests at the
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assumption central to his analysis, Waldron narrows his
discussion in a manner that obscures the strongest arguments
for the legitimacy of judicial review. Indeed, his arguments
systematically underestimate the importance of securing the
constitutive conditions of legitimate democratic self-government;
as a result, his argument insufficiently attends to the question of
when legislation by the majority constitutes a legitimate exercise
of political power. It is as though he raised the issue of the legality
of flag burning and then simply ignored the question of whether
flag burning is a protected form of speech.
The purpose of this article is twofold: (1) to argue that
Waldron’s case against judicial review is fatally flawed; and (2)
to defend a constitutionalist case for judicial review that is
responsive to contemporary critiques.32 This article proceeds in
four parts. Part I examines the basis for Waldron’s assumption
that the leading arguments offered by proponents of judicial
review rely upon consequentialist assumptions and argues that
Waldron misrepresents the principal arguments offered in
favor of judicial review by basing his criticisms of these
arguments upon that assumption. After rejecting Waldron’s
consequentialist assumption, Part II outlines the leading
arguments that support the constitutional entrenchment of
rights protections—the practice that generates the court’s
authority to strike down legislation. Part III then assesses
Waldron’s critique of these arguments, focusing on his claim that
pluralistic disagreement regarding the necessary conditions for
the establishment of legitimate democratic institutions renders
the entrenchment of any particular account of these conditions
disrespectful to those who dissent from that account.33 After
assessing Waldron’s critique, Part IV provides a constitutionalist
case for judicial review by arguing that (1) constitutional rights
enable, rather than restrict, majority rule because such rights
define the category of preferences that is relevant to democratic
expense of responsible civic engagement. See JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR: A
SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 33–96 (2008) (describing the political processes that
led to atrocities in Darfur); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS:
COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 185–233 (2001) (arguing that
millions of Rwandans intentionally and enthusiastically collaborated in a collective act
of genocide); ED VULLIAMY, SEASONS IN HELL: UNDERSTANDING BOSNIA’S WAR 73–118
(1994) (describing Serbian collective responsibility for atrocities in Bosnia).
32 See generally BELLAMY, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 3 (questioning the
assumption that judicial review is necessary to protect the fundamental rights of
citizens in a constitutional democracy); TULLY, supra note 3 (arguing that entrenched
rights should be modifiable through political action by the majority); Allan, supra note
3 (arguing that the values that justify respect for rights also justify the rejection of the
enforcement of entrenched rights by the courts).
33 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 221, 238.
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decision-making; and (2) judicial review performs an essential
function in implementing constitutional rights. This article
ultimately concludes that judicial review constitutes an essential
element of democratic forms of government; and therefore, that
the arguments that judicial review is inconsistent with
democracy—offered by Waldron and others—fail.
I.

WALDRON’S CONSEQUENTIALIST ASSUMPTION

In The Core of the Case, Waldron grounds his criticisms
of the leading arguments for judicial review in the assumption
that the principal advocates of judicial review rely upon
consequentialist arguments. That is, he argues that when
theorists argue in favor of judicial review, they rely primarily
on the argument that assigning the authority to resolve
fundamental questions regarding rights to courts, rather than
legislatures, produces consequences that are more just (the
“consequentialist assumption”).34 Waldron assigns such a
significant portion of his article responding to consequentialist
arguments that his case against judicial review can be said to
stand or fall with his assumption that the case for judicial
review is, essentially, consequentialist.35 Since, as will be
argued, the consequentialist assumption is false, Waldron’s
reliance on this assumption reveals his case to be fatally
flawed.
It is important to note the extraordinary and
counterintuitive nature of Waldron’s consequentialist assumption
at the outset. Waldron’s critique of the principal arguments in
favor of judicial review depends upon the consequentialist
assumption—the assumption, that is, that advocates of judicial
review rely primarily upon consequentialist arguments. Yet the
principal advocates of judicial review—particularly John Rawls
and Ronald Dworkin—are noted for their rejection of
consequentialism.36 The social practice of respecting the rights of
34 Waldron suggests that judicial review advocates’ reliance upon a resultbased criterion might not be fully consequentialist because the results in question have
a partially deontological character since they are essentially connected to the
protection of rights. Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1374. Waldron’s
suggestion, however, is unpersuasive. Consequentialism simply requires the
employment of a criterion that defines value as a function of results or consequences.
35 Id. at 1376–86.
36 Waldron identifies Rawls and Dworkin as the principal advocates of the case
for judicial review (the view that Waldron rejects) by placing quotes from each of these
theorists in the epigraph to his most developed critique of judicial review. WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 209. Rawls is particularly noted for his rejection of
utilitarianism, which is the principal contemporary theoretical representative of
consequentialism. The principle of utility, Rawls argues, is “inconsistent with the idea of
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members of society requires that the majority may not pursue
collective goals when doing so compromises the fundamental
interests of some person or group,37 while consequentialism
requires that the community should maximize the realization
of social benefits regardless of effects on the interests of
individuals or groups.38 John Rawls cites this disregard for the
fundamental interests of individuals and groups as the defining
characteristic of consequentialism in its purest form: classical
utilitarianism.39 Utilitarianism, Rawls argues, does not “take
seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals.”40 Dworkin
is similarly notorious for the argument that decisions of law must
be justified on the basis of considerations of principle, not policy.
Policy considerations, Dworkin notes, require the realization of
good outcomes in the future, while considerations of principle
require that a defensible legal decision must look back to the
facts that generated the case or controversy in order to
determine which party has a right that the court should decide
in its favor.41 While consequentialism is essentially forwardlooking, Dworkin’s approach to reasoning and justification is
resolutely backwards-looking. It would, in fact, be quite
surprising if Dworkin and other advocates of judicial review were
consequentialists, since there is an obvious inconsistency between
consequentialism and the advocacy of judicial review designed to
vindicate rights.
The principal theorists who argue in favor of judicial
review—such
as
Dworkin
and
Cohen—thus
reject
consequentialism. Why, then, does Waldron insist on attributing
reciprocity implicit in the notion of a well-ordered society.” RAWLS, supra note 24, at 14.
Dworkin labels consequentialist arguments in law “argument[s] of policy,” and argues
that legal decisions in hard cases “should be generated by principle not policy.” DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 84.
37 Rights theorists argue that this kind of respect for rights is a requirement
of justice and legitimacy because free and equal persons who chose the principles to
regulate their civic relations under fair conditions would never consent to principles
that failed to provide such protection. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON
GOVERNMENT §§ 22–24 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1968); RAWLS,
supra note 24, at 13.
38 Consequentialists argue that all moral and political questions, including
questions involving rights, should be determined based upon an assessment of the
consequences produced. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Consequentialism, in CONSEQUENTIALISM
95–107 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003).
39 Classical utilitarianism asserts that all moral and political questions
should be resolved in the manner that maximizes happiness. According to this view,
rights should be respected only when doing so maximizes total or average happiness.
Classical utilitarianism is thus committed to the view that the community should
maximize surplus regardless of effects on the interests of individuals or groups. See,
e.g., RAWLS, supra note 24, at 22–27.
40 Id. at 29.
41 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 82–90.
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to these theorists consequentialist arguments that they in fact
reject? Waldron first states the consequentialist assumption in
Law and Disagreement—the book that provides the most fully
developed account of Waldron’s critique of judicial review—and
Waldron justifies his reliance on this assumption on the basis
of his interpretation of arguments that Dworkin developed in
Freedom’s Law—the book in which Dworkin provides the final
statement of his arguments in favor of judicial review.42
Remarkably, Waldron adopts the consequentialist assumption
based on his reading of a single passage in Freedom’s Law, a
passage that, as will be argued, he misinterprets. Waldron
compounds this interpretive error by treating this passage both
as the summation of Dworkin’s views on judicial review and as
representative of the entire body of literature that advocates
judicial review.43 Waldron’s insistence that advocates of judicial
review rely primarily upon consequentialist arguments is
particularly unfortunate because this insistence has influenced
and misled not only scholars who share Waldron’s critical attitude
towards judicial review,44 but also scholars who argue in favor of
judicial review.45 Waldron’s influence over other participants in
the debate introduces a new level of confusion into a discourse
that has never been characterized by conceptual clarity.46
42 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 294–95. In The Core
of the Case, Waldron cites passages from Joseph Raz and John Rawls to support his
view that advocates of judicial review offer consequentialist arguments. Waldron, The
Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1368, 1376–79. This article will discuss Waldron’s
reliance on these passages below.
43 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 294–95; Waldron,
The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1369–86. Waldron treats this passage as
representative of the work of all of the major advocates of judicial review.
44 See BELLAMY, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 3, at 90–100.
45 See, e.g., Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 1695–99. Fallon
accepts Waldron’s assertion that the principal arguments offered by advocates of judicial
review are consequentialist, and he is persuaded by Waldron’s critique of straightforward
consequentialist arguments for judicial review. Id. at 1696–99. Fallon argues, however, that
judicial review is justified because it strengthens the protection of fundamental rights by
creating multiple veto points to prevent rights violations. Id. at 1705–10, 1735–36. In
focusing his defense of judicial review on the outcomes produced in a legal system that
includes judicial review, Fallon thus allows Waldron’s consequentialist assumption to
determine the substance of his (Fallon’s) defense of judicial review. See Lever, Democracy
and Judicial Review, supra note 5. Lever accepts Waldron’s claim that advocates of judicial
review offer consequentialist arguments, while its critics offer procedure-based arguments.
Id. at 805–07. She also accepts his conclusion that consequentialist arguments for judicial
review are inconclusive, but she rejects his claim that procedure-based arguments bear
heavily against judicial review. Id. at 808–09, 813–16. Lever’s attempt to generate
procedure-based arguments for judicial review, however, is infected by Waldron’s
consequentialist focus—she argues primarily that the procedure-based virtue of judicial
review is its tendency to produce beneficial effects by providing otherwise unavailable
opportunities for wronged persons to vindicate their rights. See id. at 815–16.
46 The conceptual clarity of discussions of judicial review is generally
undermined by the failure of many participants in the discussion to distinguish between

174

A.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

Misinterpreting Dworkin

In Waldron’s defense, it should be noted that the passage
in Freedom’s Law that inspired his acceptance of the
consequentialist assumption is somewhat ambiguous and
confusing. Moreover, Dworkin does seem to intend that this
passage should characterize a major portion of his contribution
to rights theory and the case for judicial review. Despite the
obscurity in Dworkin’s language, it is clear that this passage
cannot support Waldron’s interpretation.47 The language reads,
in relevant part:
What shall we say about the remaining questions, the institutional
questions the moral reading does not reach?
I see no alternative but to use a result-driven rather than a
procedure-driven standard for deciding them. The best institutional
structure is the one best calculated to produce the best answers to
the essentially moral question of what the democratic conditions
actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those conditions.48

On first reading, Waldron’s interpretation does not seem
completely unreasonable. In the above passage, Dworkin does
write that he favors a result-driven standard. Initially, then,
Waldron’s assumption that Dworkin—in this passage—argues
in favor of adopting those institutional arrangements that
protect rights most successfully seems to be a plausible reading
of Dworkin’s argument. Plausibility, however, is not enough.
Waldron’s argument in The Core of the Case is anchored in the
assumption that these sentences have precisely the meaning he
assigns to them.
A more careful reading of these sentences establishes
that they do not in fact have this meaning. According to
Waldron, the “best answers” to which Dworkin refers are the
answers to the specific questions of law presented by the
particular case or controversy in question.49 Dworkin’s language,
however, refers to “the best answers to the essentially moral
question of what the democratic conditions [the conditions that
must be satisfied before a true democratic community can be
said to exist] actually are.”50 Therefore, the “best answers” to
which Dworkin refers are answers to fundamental questions of
moral philosophy, and the institutions that will provide the
democracy and majoritarianism. The significance of this distinction is discussed below.
See infra Sections II.A, III.C.
47 The second and third sentences provide the basis for Waldron’s interpretation.
48 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 34.
49 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 291–92.
50 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 34.
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“best answers” are those that are best equipped to provide the
most carefully reasoned responses to fundamental questions of
moral philosophy. Furthermore, Dworkin provides an explicit
account of the considerations he views as relevant in determining
which institutions are equipped to generate the “best answers,”
and these considerations have nothing to do with an institution’s
ability to resolve questions of law presented in particular
controversies in a manner that produces the best consequences—
that is, in a manner that protects rights most effectively.51
Although Waldron forms his consequentialist assumption
based on Dworkin’s discussion of these issues in Freedom’s Law,
Dworkin actually presents his full account of the relevant
issues in Law’s Empire.52 Dworkin argues that an advocate of
the view that the legislature will provide the best answers to
fundamental moral questions—e.g., how should the Court
balance fairness and justice in interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause?—must be prepared to argue that their
position is justified either by considerations of justice or by
considerations of fairness.53 If the advocate offers a case based
upon considerations of justice, the advocate must make one of
two possible arguments. The first argument would be that
members of a society are simply not entitled to rights
protections at all, which is to say that the legislature’s
judgments regarding the substance and extent of rights
protections must always be decisive.54 In order to justify this
view, however, the advocate must defend the implausible claim
that members of a democracy are entitled to no protections at
all against the will of the majority.55 The second argument
51 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 369–79 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE].
52 “I have tried to describe [the democratic conditions] elsewhere, and will
only summarize my conclusions here.” DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 24.
In Law’s Empire, Dworkin outlines his argument that the courts, and not the
legislature, are best equipped to generate answers to fundamental moral questions in a
manner that ensures that democratic constitutional arrangements are more just.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 51, at 374–76. The outline establishes the nature of
the considerations that Dworkin views as relevant to the question of which institutions
are equipped to provide the best answers to the fundamental moral questions that are
central to democracy. See id. at 373–79.
53 For the purposes of this argument, Dworkin defines “justice” and “fairness”
as separate and discrete political virtues. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 51, at 374.
A political response to a fundamental moral question realizes the virtue of justice if it
brings political arrangements closer to realizing what political morality “actually
requires.” Id. An interpretation realizes the virtue of fairness if it causes political
arrangements to correspond more closely to views about political morality that are
actually held by members of the community. Id.
54 Id. at 374–75.
55 Such a view would be implausible because, to accept the view, one would
have to assume that the Bill of Rights is actually intended to perform no function.
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would be that legislatures are more likely than courts to
generate the best answers to fundamental moral questions.56
However, as Dworkin notes, there is no compelling reason to
assume, a priori, that this claim is true,57 nor does an assessment
of the relative quality of historical judgments by courts and
legislatures on fundamental moral questions provide adequate
support for such a claim.58
If the argument is grounded in considerations of
fairness instead, then the advocate must argue that it is
somehow fairer in a free and democratic society for the
legislature to resolve fundamental moral questions.59 In order
to justify this view, however, Dworkin notes that the advocate
must defend two implausible claims. The first claim would be
that fairness requires that the power of the majority can only
be limited by restrictions that members of this majority
actually accept.60 According to this view, for example, if the
majority of voters in the post-Civil War South refused to accept
restrictions on their power to reestablish slavery, then they
would have the power to reestablish slavery, and this power
would not be limited by any rights claims of their potential
victims. Under this view, the decisions to strike down statutes
in Brown v. Board of Education,61 Sweatt v. Painter,62 Lawrence
v. Texas63—and every other case in which the Court struck
down a statute enacted by a representative legislature—must
be viewed as clearly and obviously wrong. The second claim
would be that fairness is the paramount political value, meaning
that if fairness and basic questions of human dignity conflict, as
demonstrated by the slavery example above, fairness (or
deference to the will of the majority) must always prevail.
According to such a view, we must—again—necessarily conclude
Id. at 375.
Id.
58 As Dworkin notes, if the United States had assigned the authority to the
legislature, rather than the courts, to resolve the moral questions raised during the
civil rights movement, public schools would have remained segregated, poll taxes and
literacy tests would have continued to prevent the vast majority of blacks in Southern
states from registering to vote, and state legislation would have continued to require
“separate but equal” treatment of blacks in many dimensions of political and social life.
See id. at 375–76.
59 Id. at 375.
60 Id. at 376.
61 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down state laws
establishing separate public schools for white and black students).
62 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (striking down a Texas state law
excluding black students from the state law school).
63 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down sodomy laws in
Texas that criminalized same-sex sexual activity and invalidating similar sodomy laws
in thirteen other states).
56
57
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that the Brown, Sweatt, and Lawrence cases were decided
incorrectly. If legal decisions should always privilege fairness over
justice, then the will of the majority—as expressed in the relevant
legislative enactments—to continue segregation, to exclude
minorities from the state law school, to allow state officials to
suppress reports of their misconduct through frivolous libel
actions, and to deny privacy protections to gay citizens should
clearly have justified decisions upholding the statutes challenged
in each of the cited cases. Arguments that the legislature will
provide the best answers to fundamental questions in moral
philosophy, Dworkin concludes, are simply unpersuasive.64
Certainly, the outline of the argument that Dworkin
provides is far from dispositive. Indeed, Waldron is entitled to
dispute both Dworkin’s account of the structure of the argument
and Dworkin’s specific conclusions. Dworkin’s outline does,
however, specifically describe the considerations that he views as
relevant in identifying the institution best equipped to resolve
foundational moral questions for a free and democratic society.
These considerations are clearly not consequentialist. Thus,
when Waldron, in The Core of the Case, argues that Dworkin
relies on consequentialist arguments in support of judicial
review, he fundamentally misrepresents Dworkin’s arguments.
B.

Attributing Consequentialism to Other Advocates of
Judicial Review

In The Core of the Case, however, Waldron no longer
relies exclusively upon passages from Dworkin to support his
view that the arguments of leading advocates of judicial review
rely upon consequentialist reasoning. Instead, Waldron cites
Joseph Raz and, remarkably, John Rawls.65 The language that
he cites from Raz and Rawls, however, fails to provide plausible
support for the claim that the leading advocates of judicial
review are consequentialists despite their explicit disavowals of
consequentialism. Raz has never been a leading participant in
the debate over judicial review,66 and the language that
Waldron cites from Raz is from an article whose topic is neither
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 51, at 376–77.
Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1374, 1376.
66 Raz focuses on more fundamental and abstract questions such as the
normativity of law, the basic structure of legal systems, and the relation between law
and morality. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970) (examining
the structure of legal systems); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (2d ed. 2009)
(examining the normative basis of the law); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
(1986) (examining the foundations in value theory of respect for freedom and autonomy). He
has not written a single article, chapter, or book specifically focusing on judicial review.
64

65
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judicial review nor the constitutional protection of rights.67
Similarly, the language that Waldron cites from Rawls is
ironically language in favor of resolving contested questions by
majority decision, language that is incompatible with
consequentialist logic.68 In the passage that Waldron cites,
Rawls rejects the views of consequentialists who argue that
social choice should take account of the relative intensity of
preferences69 and asserts that majority rule secures “the greater
justice of the legal order”70 within well-ordered institutions.
Rawls argues that majority rule should therefore not be
compromised in order to maximize preference satisfaction.71
Presumably, Waldron must agree with this argument.
In The Core of the Case, Waldron fundamentally
mischaracterizes the leading arguments in favor of judicial
review. As a result, none of the responses that he provides to
arguments in favor of judicial review are relevant to the
argument, much less persuasive. Therefore, Waldron’s argument
against judicial review as presented in The Core of the Case is
fatally flawed since he fails to address any of the significant
counter-arguments offered by proponents of judicial review.
Waldron has argued articulately against the real case for
judicial review in his earlier work,72 however, and this earlier
work demands a fair examination. The next section will set out
the arguments supporting judicial review that are actually
offered by its leading proponents, arguments Waldron addresses
in his earlier work.
II.

CLASSICAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judges derive their authority to strike down legislation
primarily from the rights-conferring provisions of the Bill of
Rights. If the constitutionally entrenched rights contained in
the Bill of Rights reduce the power of the majority, in what sense
67 Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1374 n.71 (citing Joseph
Raz, Disagreement in Politics, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 45–46 (1998)). “A natural way to
proceed is to assume that the enforcement of fundamental rights should be entrusted to
whichever political decision-procedure is, in the circumstances of time and place, most
likely to enforce them well . . . .” Raz, Disagreement in Politics, supra, at 45.
68 Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1374 n.71 (citing RAWLS,
supra note 24).
69 That is, Rawls rejects the view that social choice should assign greater
weight in policy decisions to the views of persons who care most intensely about an
issue. Intensity of preference should not justify unequal political influence.
70 RAWLS, supra note 24, at 230.
71 Id. Rawls argues that justice in a well-ordered legal order is best secured
by majority rule, and that majority rule should therefore not be compromised in order
to maximize preference satisfaction. Id.
72 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3.
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is their enforcement by courts consistent with democracy?
Democratic theory offers three principals, and related, responses
to this question. The authority of judges to protect rights by
striking down legislation, it is argued,73 is necessary in order to
realize: (1) the goal of self-government that motivates democratic
theory; (2) the legitimacy of political institutions; and (3) the
constitutive elements of a democratic form of government.74 These
arguments suggest that in limiting the power of the majority,
constitutionally protected rights establish the necessary
conditions for legitimate democratic self-government.
A.

The Goal of Self-Government

Advocates of judicial review and of the majoritarian
critique disagree fundamentally regarding the defining qualities
of democracy. Proponents of the majoritarian critique75 view the
satisfaction of the preferences of the majority as both necessary
and sufficient for the realization of democracy.76 Proponents of
judicial review, however, argue for an alternate conception of
democracy called the “constitutional conception,” which asserts
that the defining quality of democratic government is not
unconditional fidelity to the preferences of the majority, but
rather the joint and equal participation of citizens in the process
of self-government.77 Democracy, according to this view, is
realized when each member of society is guaranteed the right
to participate on equal terms in the process of self-government.78
This view argues that democracy is an attractive form of
73 E.g., DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 17 (arguing that
“[d]emocracy means government subject to conditions”); BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 9 (arguing that rights protections are “central to the ideal of
democracy”); Cohen, Democracy, supra note 23, at 186 (arguing for a conception of
democracy as the product of “free public reasoning among equals” (emphasis omitted));
Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 1699, 1724–35 (arguing that the
institution of judicial review is actually well designed to safeguard individual rights and
will therefore “actually enhance, rather than undermine, a . . . [democratic] regime’s
overall political legitimacy”).
74 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 17, 24–25.
75 The majoritarian critique of judicial review argues that questions regarding
rights should not be decided by judges; rather, those questions should be resolved by the
elected and democratically accountable representatives of the majority. See WALDRON,
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 108–16.
76 Id.
77 Joshua Cohen and Ronald Dworkin offer distinct but related accounts of this
argument. Since both accounts work from similar considered judgments to closely related
conceptions of democracy, this subsection discusses the two accounts together. This
article adopts Dworkin’s title for this account (the “constitutional conception”) rather than
Cohen’s (the “deliberative conception”) to underline the connection to the notion of
entrenchment. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 17; Cohen, Democracy,
supra note 23, at 185–87.
78 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 17.
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government because it makes possible a form of life in which
persons can genuinely be said to govern themselves.79 Each
person can genuinely be said to participate as an equal in the
process of self-government, the constitutional conception argues,
only when each person’s interests are treated with equal
concern and respect, so that persons “can appropriately regard
themselves as partners in a joint venture.”80
Satisfaction of the condition of equal concern and
respect requires that the state must limit the influence of
certain types of preferences on the process of social choice.81 In
particular, preferences inconsistent with the fundamental
democratic commitment to political equality should never
exercise a decisive influence over collective decisions.82 Persons
disadvantaged by policies deriving their support from such
preferences would be deprived of liberties or opportunities
precisely because “they are thought less worthy of concern and
respect than others are.”83
The requirement that democracy should filter the process
of social choice to limit the influence of such preferences thus
expresses a constitutive condition that defines the proper
relation between preferences and democratic decision-making.
Constitutional rights are designed to realize this requirement
by limiting the influence on social choice of preferences
inconsistent with the democratic commitment to political
equality.84 In filtering the output of social choice in this manner,
entrenched rights implement the requirement that the legitimate
exercise of political power must reflect equal concern and
respect for each citizen, thus, performing an important role in
satisfying the necessary conditions of democratic selfgovernment.85 Accordingly, when courts enforce constitutionally
protected rights, they perform an essential role in securing the
necessary conditions of democratic self-government.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 25.
81 Id. at 22–26.
82 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 232–38, 266–78.
This argument has been presented most forcefully by Dworkin, but is also favored by
Cohen, Holmes, and most other advocates of the constitutionalist conception. See
Cohen, Democracy, supra note 23, at 212–21 (arguing that preferences to implement
policies that cannot be justified to those affected are unacceptable inputs into democratic
social choice); HOLMES, supra note 22, at 172–77 (arguing that constitutional restrictions
on the power of the majority are necessary to prevent the majority from creating
conditions that undermine the capacity of citizens for free, informed, and creative choice).
83 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 275.
84 Id. at 232–38.
85 Id.
79
80
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The Legitimacy of Political Institutions

A second set of arguments in favor of judicial review
focuses on the relationship between consent, legitimacy, and
restriction on the power of the majority. In a democracy,
exercises of political power derive their authority from the will
of the majority. But not every exercise of power authorized by
the majority is legitimate. For example, if legitimate political
power must derive from the consent of the governed, then the
employment of political power to enslave or disenfranchise a
resistant minority is not legitimate. Even if authorized by the
majority, such an exercise of power fails the test of legitimacy
since it could not achieve the consent of the victimized
minority. A sovereign power that enacts legislation violating the
conditions of political legitimacy forfeits its own legitimacy.86
Accordingly, unless the power of the majority is limited so that
the policies that it authorizes are legitimate, exercises of power by
the majority do not reliably constitute legitimate acts of selfgovernment. In order to establish and maintain a democratic form
of government, the majority must therefore exercise its power
within the limits set by the conditions of political legitimacy.
An argument that establishes the legitimacy of a
sovereign’s employment of power will also establish the obligation
of its citizens to obey its political decisions. Dworkin argues that
the dual relation of the notions of legitimacy and obligation define
a legitimate form of government as a government in which
“constitutional structure and practices are such that its citizens
have a general obligation to obey [its] political decisions.”87
Therefore, the necessary conditions of legitimacy are the
conditions that must be satisfied before citizens have a political
obligation to obey the government’s decisions.88
Dworkin first identifies the three mainstream arguments
that legal scholars and theorists view as viable justifications for
political obligation: Lockean tacit consent theory, Rawls’ natural
duty concept, and the fair play argument.89 Dworkin rejects each
of the three accounts as an acceptable foundation for political
obligation because each faces overwhelming objections.90 First,
Lockean tacit consent theory fails to justify political obligation
because tacit consent is not given freely through a choice
among genuine alternatives. According to this interpretation of
86
87
88
89
90

See LOCKE, supra note 37, at §§ 22–24.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 51, at 191.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 192–94.
Id.
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the Lockean view, consent is inferred simply because citizens
continue to live in the community and benefit from the
protection of the state.91 Since this tacit consent is not the
product of conscious or informed reflection, it provides no real
foundation for arguments in favor of political obligation. Second,
John Rawls’s notion of a natural duty to support just institutions
fails to explain how citizens under a just government could have
a special duty to obey the political decisions of that particular
government.92 The theory, that is, fails to explain why natural
duty does not require equal support for the authority of any
and all just institutions. As a result, the theory cannot justify a
particularized obligation to respect the authority of any single
state or set of political institutions. Finally, the fair play
argument assumes that people incur obligations simply by
receiving unsolicited benefits. According to this theory, a
person who has received benefits under an existing political
organization has an obligation to accept the authority of the
political decisions of that organization. The simple act of accepting
benefits, according to this argument, constitutes consent
sufficient to justify political obligation. As Dworkin points out,
however, this theory moves much too quickly in inferring consent
from the acceptance of unsolicited gratuitous benefits.93 It is not
plausible to suggest that persons incur powerful obligations
simply by accepting things they did not seek.
Dworkin argues instead that political obligation is most
plausibly justified through an account of the special responsibilities
that are generated when persons participate in social practices.94
For example, persons who assume the role of friendship take up
certain obligations of fidelity, honesty, and reciprocity. One does
not formally consent to these obligations; they are simply part of
what it means to participate in this particular practice.
Similarly, participants in the social practice of self-government
assume certain obligations simply through their intentional
choice to participate.
While intentional participation in the practice of selfgovernment is a necessary condition of political obligation, it is
not sufficient. For example, person A’s duties to person B after
91 According to Dworkin’s account of Lockean tacit consent theory, citizens
tacitly consent to the authority of the state if, after reaching the age of consent, they do
not emigrate. See id. at 192.
92 According to Dworkin’s account of the natural duty of justice, moral
persons have a duty to support “just or nearly just” institutions. Id. Dworkin, however,
notes that such a natural duty of justice would be too general to justify the legitimacy
of any particular regime. Id.
93 Id. at 193–95.
94 Id. at 196–200.
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intentionally assuming the role of friendship to person B are
contingent upon the acceptance of reciprocal duties by person
B. Similarly, participation in the practice of joint selfgovernment grounds an obligation to obey the will of the
majority only if relations among the participants in this practice
are characterized by reciprocity. Dworkin argues that reciprocity
in the context of self-government requires that participants in
the practice view themselves as subject to special obligations
that hold distinctly among members of the group.95 They must
recognize these obligations as personal, running from person to
person within the group, and as flowing from a general
responsibility of equal concern for the well-being of each member
of the group.96 Only if the obligations are generated through a
political process in which the well-being of each member is
treated with equal concern and respect can individuals view
themselves as participating under conditions of true reciprocity,
and only under such conditions does an obligation to obey exist.
This argument, this article suggests, offers an
interpretation of a claim made by Dworkin in Taking Rights
Seriously.97 In that earlier work, he argues that an institution’s
authority over persons is limited by the best understanding of
what it is fair to assume that persons who accept the authority
of the state have undertaken to accept in participating in the
social practice of civil society.98 Dworkin’s discussion of political
legitimacy in Law’s Empire offers an account of what it is fair
to assume that persons undertook to accept in participating in
democratic self-government. Such persons, Dworkin concludes,
implicitly accepted only political authority that treats the interests
of each member of society with equal concern and respect.
If one accepts the argument that a political process
committed to equal concern for each citizen must reject
preference inputs into social choice that are inconsistent with
the fundamental democratic commitment to political equality,
then this analysis of political legitimacy establishes that
legitimate political institutions must similarly restrict the
influence of such preferences as determinants of social choice. In
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199–200.
97 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 101–07. Dworkin
illustrates this point in his analysis of the institutional rights and obligations that are
generated through the decision to participate in a chess tournament. Id. at 101–05.
Participants in a chess tournament accept the obligation to respect the referee’s
authority to resolve contested readings of the rules, but only if the referee supplies
judgments of a particular type: judgments that are based upon considerations that
reflect the character of the practice of chess-playing. Id. at 102–05.
98 Id. at 104–05.
95
96
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addition, if one accepts the related argument that constitutional
rights are the political mechanism that most effectively protects
citizens from the effects of such preferences, then this analysis
supports the claim that when courts enforce constitutional
rights, they perform a function necessary to the preservation of
healthy democracy.
C.

Precommitment and the Constitutive Elements of
Democracy

A third argument in favor of judicial review focuses on
the role of the courts in implementing basic undertakings to
which members of a legitimate political society commit to at its
founding. Precommitment consists of the decision to restrict
future freedom of choice in order to realize benefits that result
from such self-constraint.99 This idea is well represented by the
example of Ulysses,100 who literally restricted his freedom by
binding himself to his ship’s mast in order to realize the benefit
of hearing the Sirens.101 Similarly, a society that precommits to
respect an entrenched right to free speech realizes the benefit
of free public discussion and debate.102 Since the entrenchment
of rights involves a society’s collective decision to restrict future
freedom of choice, the decision to entrench rights may be
viewed as a form of precommitment to rules that are necessary
conditions for the realization of democratic institutions.103
The analogy between the entrenchment of rights by a
society and intentional precommitment by an individual, however,
is imperfect. A society does not choose to precommit with the
unified self-awareness of an individual. Therefore, the model of
precommitment will yield valuable insights regarding the nature
of entrenched rights only if it distinguishes between “self-binding”
and “incidental” constraints.104 Self-binding involves the intentional
adoption of a constraint on the agent’s decision set.105 Incidental
99 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 76–77 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES].
100 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. 12, ll. 160–204 (Edward McCrorie trans., 2004).
101 Jon Elster offers, as a counterpoint, the more contemporary example of
Johnny Hodges, the extravagant jazz musician, who restricted his freedom by arranging
to be paid on a daily basis in order to secure the benefit of control over his tendency to
spend his money immediately. See ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 99, at 38.
102 HOLMES, supra note 22, at 169–72.
103 Id.; see also ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 99, at 36–111 (arguing that selfbinding is an effective method for addressing collective weakness of the will); Holmes,
supra note 23, at 195, 240.
104 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 4 (2000) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND].
105 Id.
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constraints, however, involve limitations on that decision set
which may have been adopted for reasons other than self-binding,
but which nevertheless produce the benefits of self-binding.106
Only the latter notion of self-binding as an incidental
constraint is relevant to an analysis of the entrenchment of
rights by a society. It is therefore inappropriate when developing
an account of self-binding as a justification for judicial review, to
apply the notion of self-binding to this phenomenon, since: (1) a
society is not an individual; (2) there is no reliable method for
determining whether ratifiers of entrenched rights are motivated
by the desire to bind themselves in order to realize resulting
benefits; and (3) ratification by a particular generation of
citizens could not precommit future generations.107 However, the
notion of an incidental constraint performs a potentially
important explanatory function in an account of the status and
justification of entrenched rights. Entrenched rights—which,
like other incidental constraints, may have been introduced for
reasons unrelated to precommitment—nevertheless generate
benefits of the kind associated with self-binding. Bills of rights
containing adequate protections of freedom of expression, religion,
assembly, and conscience, as well as equal protection and due
process guarantees, limit the decision set of the majority in a
manner that puts in place the necessary conditions for
democratic government. Enforcement of these rights through
judicial review secures those conditions.
The above arguments suggest that when societies
entrench rights as elements of their basic institutions (e.g., by
adopting a Bill of Rights), the entrenchment of rights performs
an enabling function in making possible the realization of
democratic institutions. In securing procedural and substantive
guarantees that are necessary conditions for the realization of
democracy, the entrenchment of rights contributes practically to
the achievement and maintenance of democratic forms of
government. Furthermore, the entrenchment of rights attempts
to ensure that the political arrangements realized approximate
the democratic ideal of legitimate self-government by requiring
that citizens must be guaranteed equal standing as co-legislators
and equal concern and respect for their interests as subjects.
Since judicial review performs an important role in implementing
106 Bicameralism, as Elster notes, is often “introduced by elite minorities to control
popular majorities.” ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 99, at 90. Nevertheless, “by virtue of its
delaying and cooling down properties,” bicameralism produces benefits generally
associated with precommitment. Id. This beneficial effect arguably both justifies the
institutional form and explains its persistence.
107 See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 104, at 167–74.
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such rights, judicial review necessarily performs an essential role
in securing the necessary conditions for a healthy democratic selfgovernment. This section has reviewed the classical arguments
for judicial review; the next section assesses Waldron’s responses
to these arguments, as developed in his earlier work.108
III.

WALDRON’S CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Waldron rejects the constitutionalist arguments for
judicial review discussed in Part II, arguing that the practice of
judicial review transfers the authority to resolve important
issues to an “undemocratic”109 branch of government. While
Waldron devotes little attention to constitutionalist arguments
for judicial review in The Core of the Case,110 he discusses these
issues exhaustively in his earlier work. The discussion of his
views in this section therefore describes and assesses arguments
developed in the critique of constitutionalism and judicial review
that Waldron presents in his earlier work.
It is important to emphasize that Waldron offers two
distinct lines of attack against judicial review. First, he argues
that advocates of judicial review ground their justifications of
judicial review in the consequentialist assumption, but, as
argued in Part I, this argument against judicial review fails.
Second, Waldron develops a series of arguments criticizing the
constitutionalist justification of judicial review. In developing his
critique of the constitutionalist conception, Waldron argues that
constitutionalist advocates of judicial review (a) insufficiently
attend to “the right to have one’s voice counted”111 in resolving
controversies in a democracy; (b) assign the authority to resolve
fundamental questions regarding the meaning and extent of
rights to an “undemocratic” branch of government; (c) fail to
take proper account of the good faith commitment to rights that
should be assumed to exist in democratic societies; (d)
underestimate the significance of pluralist objections to the
argument that entrenched rights are a necessary condition of
legitimacy; and (e) model the entrenchment of rights inaccurately
108 See WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 209–312; WALDRON,
DIGNITY, supra note 12, at 124–66.
109 Waldron considers the judiciary to be an “undemocratic” branch of
government because judges are usually appointed rather than elected. Waldron, A RightBased Critique, supra note 3, at 39.
110 In this article, Waldron responds almost exclusively to the consequentialist
argument in favor of judicial review that he attributes to his interlocutors. Waldron,
The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1369–406.
111 Id. at 1373, 1375.
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as a form of precommitment.112 This section rejects that set of
arguments because it insufficiently attends to the question of
when legislation by the majority constitutes a legitimate exercise
of political power.
A.

Waldron’s Critique I: Judicial Review Fails to Show
Respect for Persons

Waldron argues that judicial enforcement of entrenched
rights prevents members of the democratically elected legislature
from performing their “normal functions of revision, reform, and
innovation.”113 Thus, because it interferes with the proper
functions of representative government, judicial review involves
the “peculiar insult” of depriving persons of the power to make
decisions that are centrally important to their rights and
interests.114 Therefore, legitimate political institutions should
assign the authority to resolve questions regarding rights to the
majority and its representatives.115
At the core of Waldron’s argument is the claim that the
entrenchment of rights is inconsistent with respect for persons.
First, Waldron claims that respect for persons requires strict
adherence to the principle of majority rule.116 Second, he notes
that the entrenchment of rights is necessarily inconsistent with
that principle.117 Therefore, he concludes, the entrenchment of
rights is inconsistent with respect for persons. Note, however,
that Waldron’s argument merely stipulates, rather than argues
for, an account of what respect for persons requires.118 Respect
for persons, Waldron stipulates, requires strict adherence to
the principle of majority rule.119 This stipulated assumption
dismisses without comment the obvious objections to such a
premise, objections that are both supported by extremely
persuasive arguments and grounded in fundamental elements
of the background political tradition.120 As discussed above,
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 209–312.
Id. at 221.
114 Id. at 15, 212, 238.
115 Id. at 15, 238–39, 249–52, 254, 291–302.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Stipulation involves the dogmatic assertion of a position while offering no
supporting justification.
119 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 15, 238–39, 249–52,
254, 291–302.
120 See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 37, at 323–33 (arguing that respect for members
of civil society requires the enforcement of rights protections that limit the power of the
legislature); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 62–64, 99–104, 188–92
(Roger D. Masters ed., 1978) (1762) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT]
(arguing that respect for members of civil society requires the creation of institutions that
112

113
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proponents of the constitutional conception of democracy argue
that strict adherence to the principle of majority rule—
unconstrained by judicial review—fails to show adequate respect
for persons.121 Indeed, constitutionalists argue that such an
approach impermissibly risks depriving persons of adequate
power to influence political decisions that affect their interests.122
In order to defend his view that judicial review impermissibly
constrains the majority, Waldron must defend his central
assumption that respect for persons requires strict majority rule,
notwithstanding the objections raised by constitutionalists.
Waldron addresses these objections in his argument for a
rights-based solution to the problem of disagreement regarding
the proper nature and extent of rights guarantees. Since
reasonable persons disagree regarding the proper answers to
many central questions regarding rights, Waldron argues,
conflicting views regarding those questions must be resolved
through some political process.123 The fundamental question in
establishing such a process must be the following: who is to
have the authority to resolve questions regarding the nature
and the extent of rights?124 And Waldron argues that the most
persuasive answer to this question is: the majority, in its
exercise of the right of political participation.125
While acknowledging that the right of participation is no
less controversial than other fundamental rights,126 Waldron
argues that this right grounds a uniquely appropriate method for
resolving contested questions regarding rights.127 Since the claim
transform the “will of all” into the General Will by restricting the power of the legislative
will in a manner that prevents the enactment of legislation that protects particular
(rather than general) interests); IMMANUEL KANT, RECHTSLEHRE 387–90, 457–61 (Allen
Wood ed., 1996) (1797) (arguing that respect for members of civil society requires
limitation of the power of the sovereign, which must satisfy a specific criterion: it must be
at least possible that the united will of the whole nation could agree to the sovereign’s
enactments); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 49–60 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2005) (1859)
(arguing that respect for persons requires restriction of legislation to enactments that
satisfy the harm principle); GEORG W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 557–61 (A.
V. Miller trans., 1977) (1807) (arguing that respect for persons requires the creation of
institutions that make possible a community of freedom made actual); RAWLS, supra note
24, at 3–4, 13, 57–73, 214–20, 273–76 (arguing that respect for persons requires the
creation of institutions that protect basic liberties, ensure equal opportunity, and
guarantee fair compensation); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150–52
(1974) (arguing that respect for persons requires respect for entitlements); DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 82–90 (arguing that respect for persons
requires equal concern and respect for the interests of each member of society).
121 See infra Section II.A.
122 See infra Section II.A.
123 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 250.
124 Id. at 252.
125 Id. at 15, 212, 249–52.
126 Id. at 232.
127 Id. at 249.
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that persons should possess rights is “based on a view of the
human individual as . . . a thinking agent, endowed with an
ability to deliberate morally,”128 a method of conflict resolution
that submits questions regarding rights to the moral deliberations
of individuals “calls upon the very capacities that rights as such
connote.”129 This solution constitutes a “rights-based solution” to
“the problem of authority . . . [regarding] rights”130 because it
assigns decisive authority regarding fundamental questions of
rights to the moral deliberations of rights-bearers.
Since rights theory requires viewing persons as thinking
beings possessing the ability to deliberate morally, Waldron
argues, rights theory necessarily assumes that persons are
competent to exercise the authority to resolve controversies
concerning rights.131 Therefore, an appropriate solution to the
problem of disagreement regarding rights is to permit those
competent persons to exercise their collective authority.
Note, however, that this argument involves a slide
between two views that a rights theorist might make about
persons as thinking beings. The first view assumes that persons
merely have the potential to reason morally. The second view
assumes that persons not only have the potential to reason
morally, but also reliably employ that potential for moral
judgment responsibly. Waldron assumes that rights theorists
must make the latter assumption—that persons can be trusted
to employ moral judgment responsibly. But a rights theorist
who views persons as thinking beings with the potential to
exercise moral judgment is not necessarily committed to the
view that those persons can be relied upon to exercise that
potential responsibly.132 In fact, Rousseau—who Waldron cites
approvingly as a seminal theorist of participatory law-making133—
argues that citizens who are competent to deliberate morally
would nevertheless necessarily employ their legislative authority
Id. at 250.
Id. at 249–52 (footnote omitted). That is, since—in Waldron’s view—the
argument that persons must be viewed as possessing rights is necessarily based upon
the assumption that such persons possess the power to deliberate morally, Waldron’s
solution of resolving questions about rights by allowing public moral deliberations to
generate the answers calls on the quality that justifies the very claim that persons
possess rights. Waldron, A Right-Based Critique, supra note 3.
130 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 249, 254.
131 Waldron’s language here makes it clear that he assumes that competence
to deliberate morally and competence to resolve controversies concerning rights are
entirely equivalent. The remainder of this subsection disputes this assumption.
132 As Cécile Fabre argues persuasively, “there is no inconsistency in saying
that human beings are able to think and act morally on the one hand, and that they
quite often commit appalling acts on the other hand.” Fabre, A Philosophical Argument,
supra note 22, at 91 (emphasis added).
133 WALDRON, DIGNITY, supra note 12, at 33.
128
129
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unjustly unless the power of the majority is institutionally
limited.134 Only if the will of the majority is suitably constrained,
Rousseau argues, will citizens realize their potential to legislate
justly.135 In other words, some constraint is necessary to ensure
that persons employ their faculty of moral judgment responsibly.
While rights theories necessarily assume that rightsbearers possess the potential to exercise moral judgment,
Waldron’s argument is based instead on the assumption that
rights theories must presuppose the responsible employment of
that potential, and this assumption goes far beyond the qualities
“that rights as such connote.”136 Indeed, Waldron’s argument for
a rights-based solution is grounded, not merely in the
assumptions “that rights as such connote,” but rather in an
idealized conception of the human condition; Waldron, that is,
argues explicitly that social theory should be based upon the
assumption that members of society, generally, can be relied
upon to employ the faculty of moral judgment responsibly.137
Certainly, “[i]f men were [such] angels” as Waldron appears to
assume, “no government would be necessary.”138 Since
government is necessary, Waldron’s idealized conception of both
people and legislative bodies is highly questionable, and
certainly goes beyond the qualities that “rights as such connote.”
Since Waldron fails to argue persuasively that his “rights-based
solution” is grounded merely in the qualities that “rights as such
connote,” his argument fails to justify his rights-based solution
to the problem of resolving controversies regarding rights.
In failing to argue persuasively for a rights-based solution
to the problem of disagreement regarding rights, Waldron fails to
134 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SECOND DISCOURSE 173, 177 (Roger
Masters & Judith Masters trans., 1964) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, THE SECOND
DISCOURSE]. In the absence of constraints upon the political power of the majority,
Rousseau argued, majority rule necessarily leads to “the ultimate stage of inequality . . . .
the fruit of an excess of corruption.” Id. at 177. See Alexander Kaufman, Reason, SelfLegislation, and Legitimacy: Conceptions of Freedom in the Political Thought of
Rousseau and Kant, 59 REV. POL. 25, 25–26 (1997), for a discussion of Rousseau’s
account of the necessary conditions of a just social order.
135 ROUSSEAU, THE SECOND DISCOURSE, supra note 134, at 173, 177.
136 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 252. In referring to
the qualities “that rights as such connote,” Waldron means to refer to the qualities that
we must assume that people possess if we are reasonable in viewing them as the
possessors of right-claims. Id.
137 “The attribution [of rights to individuals] . . . is typically an act of faith in the
agency and capacity for moral thinking of each of the individuals concerned.” Id. at 250.
138 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison). Madison argued that
government was necessary precisely because men (and women) are not angels and can
be counted on to pursue self-interest at the expense of the collective good. Since
Waldron insists that men (and women) can be counted upon to pursue the collective
good and not self-interest, Madison would presumably view Waldron as a person who
views men (and women) as angels. See id.
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defend his central assumption—the assumption that respect for
persons requires strict majority rule—against the objections
raised by the constitutional conception (the view favored by
advocates of judicial review). Two of Waldron’s central
arguments against judicial review—the arguments that judicial
review (a) involves a failure of respect for persons,139 and (b)
improperly excludes persons from power in making decisions
affecting their rights and interests140—rely upon this assumption.
Since these arguments rely upon an assumption that Waldron is
unable to defend, both of these arguments necessarily fail. Since
Waldron therefore fails to defend his argument that judicial
review is inconsistent with respect for persons from the objections
to that argument raised by constitutionalists, Waldron’s first
argument against judicial review fails.
B.

Waldron’s Critique II: Judicial Review Undermines the
Democratic Character of Institutions

Waldron argues that in assigning the authority to resolve
controversies regarding rights to the courts, theories of judicial
review undermine the democratic character of institutions, since
“[t]here is something lost, from a democratic point of view, when
an unelected and unaccountable individual or institution makes a
binding decision about what democracy requires.”141
Waldron assumes that the courts’ resolution of issues is
inherently less democratic than resolution through the legislature.
Yet, as discussed above,142 the liberal political tradition143 supports
the view that checks on majoritarian power such as judicial
review, are central and essential elements of a democratic
political culture.144 In particular, advocates of the constitutional
conception argue that citizens cannot be secure in their rights
to participate on equal terms in civil society unless society
ensures that there are mechanisms in place that constrain the

WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 15, 212, 238.
Id. at 293.
141 Id.
142 See supra Part II.
143 See generally LOCKE, supra note 37 (arguing that the authority of any
legitimate sovereign must be limited by unconditional rights protections guaranteed by
law); ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 120 (arguing that the legislation of
the General Will must be regulated by institutional constraints guaranteeing the double
generality of the law); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that
representative government properly operates to restrict the influence of majority
preferences).
144 See supra Section II.A.
139
140
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power of the majority.145 Since the majority cannot plausibly
oversee the enforcement of rights whose purpose is to constrain
the power of the majority, specialized institutions must perform
this function instead. The courts—with their expertise in
interpreting the practical implications of the legal tradition—
are the proper institution to oversee the protection of rights in
a healthy democracy.146
Waldron responds to this argument by simply denying
the claim that the majority cannot oversee the protection of
citizens’ rights.147 The assignment to the majority of the
authority to make decisions regarding the nature and extent of
the majority’s political power, Waldron argues, is not a circular
proceeding.148 Some political actor, Waldron claims, must
possess the power to resolve these issues, and it seems most
appropriate to assign such power to the persons whose interests
are at stake.149 Contrary to Waldron’s assumption, however, the
problem of reasonable disagreement regarding rights in a
democracy cannot be resolved simply by determining where to
locate the authority to resolve questions regarding rights. If
binding limits on the power of the majority are a necessary
precondition of a healthy democracy,150 as the constitutional
conception argues, then assigning the authority to resolve a
question regarding rights to that same majority is an inadequate
solution. Rights cannot operate as constraints on the power of
the majority if that majority also possesses the power to
determine both the meaning and range of application of those
rights.151 Contrary to Waldron’s assertions, the problem is not
only that the majority becomes the judge in its own case,152 but
rather that if such power is assigned to the majority, then
constitutional rights no longer limit the power of that majority.
145 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2; DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8; Cohen, Democracy, supra note 23.
146 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2; DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8; Cohen, Democracy, supra note 23.
147 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 298–300.
148 Id. at 298.
149 Id. at 293–94.
150 The constitutional conception of democracy “denies that it is a defining
goal of democracy that collective decisions always or normally be those that a majority
or plurality of citizens would favor if fully informed and rational. . . . Democracy means
government subject to conditions . . . of equal status for all citizens.” DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 8, at 17. These conditions include, but are not limited to,
respect for rights to free speech and expression, universal suffrage, and freedom of
conscience. Id. at 24–26.
151 “A right against the Government must be a right to do something even
when the majority thinks it would be wrong to do it.” DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 194. “[D]ecisions about rights against the majority are not
issues that in fairness ought to be left to the majority.” Id. at 142.
152 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 296–302.
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Therefore, Waldron’s argument fails to respond to the concerns
raised by the constitutional conception.
Moreover, Waldron’s argument assumes that the
democratic pedigree of the representative legislature is superior
to that of the judiciary.153 Representative government, however,
is itself incompletely democratic.154 The Federalists155—the
politician/scholars who transformed democratic theory into
workable institutions—argued that representative government
is desirable precisely because the representatives chosen will
not represent the views of their constituents literally.156 Indeed,
James Madison argued that elections lead to the selection of
persons both different from and superior to their constituents,157
and that these representatives will use their superior judgment
to further the interests of the community.158
If representative government is only incompletely
democratic, then the democratic pedigree of the legislature is
not necessarily superior to that of the courts, which protect
rights that establish the necessary conditions of democratic
self-government. Waldron’s assumption that the democratic
pedigree of the legislature is necessarily superior to that of the
courts cannot be accepted without further argument. Therefore,
Waldron fails to offer an adequate defense of his claim that the
assignment of the authority to resolve questions regarding the
meaning of rights to the courts undermines the democratic
character of institutions.

Id. at 293.
As discussed below, representatives do not represent the views of their
constituents literally. Rather, constituents elect apparently qualified individuals to
exercise their best judgment in order to protect the interests of their constituents. It is
understood that, in many cases, the representative will not vote as the majority of his
constituents would have voted. See JOHN DUNN, INTERPRETING POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
26–44 (1990); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144–67 (1967).
155 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. See generally GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787 (1998) (discussing
the centrality of the writings of Hamilton, Jay, and Madison in justifying and securing
support for the Constitution during the ratification).
156 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison). See BERNARD MANIN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 166 (1997), for a helpful discussion of
the non-identity between representative institutions and majoritarian government.
157 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
158 As Pitkin describes this relation, the representative is not bound by a
mandate to represent the literal views of her constituents, but rather is endowed with
independence to employ her judgment to realize her constituents’ interests. See PITKIN,
supra note 154, at 116–67, 145.
153
154
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Waldron’s Critique III: Judicial Review Assumes That
Citizens Cannot Govern Themselves in Good Faith

Waldron argues that democratic theory should work
from the assumption that the vast majority of citizens are
reliably committed to respect for the rights of other citizens.159
If this assumption is accepted, then democratic societies
require neither the constitutional protection of rights nor the
institution of judicial review since the majority can be trusted
to act from its good faith commitment to respect for rights.
Modern history, however, is replete with instances in which
this assumption fails. Recent examples of genocide from
Eastern Europe and Africa160 exemplify the predatory pursuit of
group interests at the expense of responsible civic engagement.
A theory of rights that presumes citizens act primarily from
responsible respect for the rights of others has little practical
value. Historical evidence provides no support for such a bold
ontological assumption.161 Nevertheless, Waldron insists that
one should view rights-bearers as acting from “good-faith
disagreement.”162 Indeed, Waldron characterizes concerns
regarding the potential abuse of unconstrained majority power
as “a panic about self-government in the political realm.”163
Why does Waldron insist that rights theory should work
from the idealized assumption that majoritarian politics
resembles “a good faith disagreement of principle,” rather than
“a feeding frenzy of interest”?164 Waldron offers two justifications
159 “My argument has proceeded on the premise that democratic politics need
not be like . . . a feeding frenzy of interest . . . .” WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT,
supra note 3, at 304.
160 See VULLIAMY, supra note 31, at 73–118 (describing Serbian collective
responsibility for atrocities in Bosnia); MAMDAMI, supra note 31, at 185–233 (arguing
that millions of Rwandans intentionally and enthusiastically collaborated in a collective
act of genocide); FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 31, at 33–96 (describing the political
processes that led to atrocities in Darfur).
161 An ontological claim aims to define the nature and structure of the world.
An author’s ontological assumptions constitute her foundational assumptions about the
conditions of the world that are relevant to her argument. The persuasiveness of the
author’s argument thus depends entirely on the truth of the propositions contained in
his/her ontological assumptions. If one of those propositions (e.g., the claim that
majoritarian politics generally takes the form of good faith disagreement) is in fact
false, then the argument necessarily fails. Examples from recent history provide strong
support for the view that Waldron’s ontological assumption should be rejected. See, e.g.,
VULLIAMY, supra note 31, at 73–118 (describing Serbian collective responsibility for
atrocities in Bosnia); MAMDAMI, supra note 31, at 185–233 (arguing that millions of
Rwandans intentionally and enthusiastically collaborated in a collective act of
genocide); FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 31, at 33–96 (describing the political processes
that led to atrocities in Darfur).
162 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 13, 304.
163 Id. at 303.
164 Id. at 304.
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for this claim. First, Waldron asserts that rights theories that
aim to guard against the abuse of power by the majority
improperly base their arguments upon a mistrust of fellow
citizens that “does not sit particularly well with the aura of
respect for their autonomy and responsibility that is conveyed by
the substance of the rights which are being entrenched.”165
Theories grounded in the assumption that persons possess the
dignity and autonomy that justify the entrenchment of rights,
Waldron argues, cannot consistently assume that citizens
participating in the democratic process will act primarily on
predatory motives.166
Putting aside the fact that Waldron’s assumptions ignore
centuries of racist legislation passed by federal and state
legislatures,167 it is important to emphasize that theories of
entrenched rights are not necessarily grounded in concerns
regarding predatory motives. A concern regarding the influence of
the passions on political judgment has arguably played a more
important historical role in motivating the entrenchment of
rights in political institutions.168 Indeed, the Federalist Papers
justified institutional limits on the power of the majority as
necessary to limit the influence of passions on adopting
legislation.169 Therefore, Waldron’s critique—which assumes a
Id. at 222.
Id. at 258.
167 During the 1890s, majorities in the democratically elected state legislatures
of eleven southern states adopted new state constitutions that disenfranchised virtually
all black voters in those states through a combination of literacy tests, poll taxes, and
residency requirements. In the first decades of the twentieth century, most southern
legislatures adopted state laws segregating schools, colleges, hospitals, orphanages,
prisons, and public facilities. Most of these laws remained in effect until the passage of
the Civil Rights Act in 1964. The members of the state legislatures who voted for these
laws and the voters who supported them can hardly be described as the product of good
faith civic-minded political engagement in pursuit of the public good. See DAVID
FREMON, THE JIM CROW LAWS AND RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1–105 (2014);
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8–97 (2004); LESLIE V. TISCHAUSER, JIM CROW LAWS
1–106 (2012). Admittedly, the U.S. Supreme Court has not covered itself in glory, either, on
questions of race. The first use of judicial review after Marbury v. Madison was the Court’s
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which the Supreme Court gratuitously ruled in dicta
that African-Americans could not be citizens of the United States. Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1856).
168 This concern was central to the thought of Alexander Hamilton, as will be
discussed below. Locke argues that rights protections and rules of law were necessary
because lack of such restraints made the sovereign “licentious.” LOCKE, supra note 37,
at 235–36. Rousseau argues that, unless institutional constraints ensured that laws
satisfy the constraint of double generality—thus ensuring protections of the rights of
the individual—public discourse would be dominated by “the unbridled passions of” all.
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 120, at 157.
169 Alexander Hamilton, for example, worried about the influence on legislation of
“those ill humors, which . . . sometimes disseminate among the people themselves,
and . . . occasion dangerous innovations in the government.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton).
165
166
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primary concern to guard against predatory motives—reflects an
imperfect understanding of the concerns that motivate democratic
political communities to entrench rights in their constitutions.
Moreover, the argument that concerns regarding
predatory behavior are inconsistent with the necessary
assumptions of rights theory fails because it attributes excessively
demanding assumptions to rights theories.170 Waldon asserts that
a theory of rights must assume that rights-bearers reliably act
responsibly in employing moral judgment. As discussed above,171
however, that theory requires only the more modest assumption
that persons possess the potential to exercise responsible moral
judgment.172 Since rights theory is not committed to the
assumption that citizens will reliably act responsibly, it is
consistent for rights theories to guard against the effects of
predatory motivations on legislation.
Waldron’s second justification for insisting that rights
theorists should assume that disputes regarding rights proceed
from good faith disagreement of principle reflects his desire “to
develop a rosy picture of legislatures and their structures”173 in
order to counteract what he views as the equally rosy pictures
offered by defenders of rights and judicial review.174 Waldron
claims that Dworkin bases his rights theory on a view of the
court as a “forum of principle.”175 Then why, Waldron asks,
should Waldron’s own attempt to work up a theory of rights
based on the view of majoritarian politics as a process of good
faith engagement be viewed with skepticism?
This argument, however, is based on a faulty analogy.
Waldron clearly means to claim that Dworkin makes the
factual assumption that courts actually operate as “forum[s] of
principle.”176 Since Dworkin employs an idealized factual
assumption in his theory, Waldron argues,177 it is equally
plausible for Waldron to rely upon an idealized factual
assumption. But Waldron fundamentally misinterprets Dworkin’s
argument, which does not contain an idealized factual
assumption. Dworkin employs the phrase “forum of principle” to

170 As discussed supra Section III.A, Waldron similarly overstates the
presuppositions of rights theory in his argument for a “rights-based” solution to the
problem of disagreement about rights. See supra Section III.A.
171 See supra Section III.B.
172 See supra Section III.A.
173 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 32.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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refer to a particular approach to legal reasoning.178 A court acts
as a forum of principle when a judge assigns the highest
priority to considerations of principle, rather than to
considerations of policy.179 Dworkin assumes that many judges
do not reason in this manner,180 and his arguments are designed
to persuade judges to adopt this approach.181 If Dworkin were—
as Waldron claims—making the descriptive claim that courts
always do operate as forums of principle, then his claim would
be factually inaccurate—at best an idealization. Dworkin’s
claim, however, is normative rather than descriptive because
he argues that courts “should” operate as forums of principle.182
If Dworkin’s claim were descriptive, his argument would be
that courts already operate as forums of principle.
Despite Waldron’s claim to the contrary,183 Dworkin’s
argument does not rely on the factual assumption that courts are
forums of principle. Waldron’s argument that his idealization of
democratic politics is analogous to Dworkin’s reference to the
court as a forum of principle is therefore unpersuasive.
Waldron’s argument relies heavily on the factual
assumption that political conflict generally reflects good-faith
engagement, notwithstanding the fact that such an assumption
is inconsistent with routine, everyday experience.184 Moreover,
Waldron fails in his attempt to justify reliance on that factual
assumption as analogous to elements of Dworkin’s argument.
Since Waldron’s assumption that political conflict generally
reflects a good-faith engagement is highly implausible, his
argument that citizens of democracies should rely on that
assumption when designing their institutions—thus eliminating
the need for judicial review to protect individual rights—is
fundamentally and fatally flawed.

RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69 (1985).
Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. Dworkin argues that courts “should make decisions of principle rather
than policy—decisions about what rights people have under our constitutional system
rather than decisions about how the general welfare is best promoted.” Id. at 69.
182 A descriptive claim is an assertion about the way things are, while a
normative claim is an assertion about the way things should be. The statement, “In
general, courts do not operate as forums of principle,” is a descriptive claim. The
assertion, “courts should operate as forums of principle,” is a normative claim.
183 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 32.
184 See the discussion of this assumption earlier in this subsection, supra
Section III.C.
178

179

198
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Waldron’s Critique IV: The Entrenchment of Rights Is
Not a Necessary Condition of Legitimate Government

Waldron next criticizes the constitutionalist argument
that the entrenchment of rights is a necessary condition of
legitimate government. Waldron, in fact, concedes that the
assurance of certain rights protections may be among such
necessary conditions.185 For example, he argues that “[d]emocracy
and majority-decision make moral sense only under certain
conditions,” the “most obvious” of which is the protection of “free
speech and freedom of association—rights which establish a
broader deliberative context in civil society for formal political
decision-making.”186 Nevertheless, Waldron still insists that the
entrenchment of rights cannot itself be such a necessary
condition.187 Reasonable persons will predictably disagree
regarding the nature of the necessary conditions of democratic
legitimacy.188 Waldron argues that no political theory can
generate a plausible basis for the entrenchment of individual
rights in the face of such disagreement.189
Waldron’s argument, however, proves too much. If the
fact of disagreement undermines the authority of any given
claim regarding the necessary conditions of legitimacy, then
the fact of disagreement similarly undermines the authority of
any participatory institution. That is, Waldron cannot
consistently appeal to the fact of disagreement to undermine
claims regarding the necessary conditions of political legitimacy
unless he also accepts the fact that the argument from
disagreement similarly undermines his own case for the authority
of democratic participation. Waldron’s argument appears to
undermine the claims to legitimacy of all theories of democratic
institutions, including his own.
Waldron assumes that he has avoided this result because
his argument for a rights-based solution to the problem of
political disagreement provides independent support for the

185 “No one thinks that any old bunch of people is entitled to impose a decision
on others, simply on the ground that there are more individuals in favour of the
decision than against it.” WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 283.
186 Id. Waldron, remarkably, argues that the majority, in a legitimate democracy,
is not unconditionally “entitled to impose a decision on others, simply on the ground that
there are more individuals in favour of the decision than against it.” Id. Waldron’s
argument here is remarkable because it seems to contradict his general claim that
majorities—in democracies—must possess the authority to resolve all contested questions
regarding rights. See id. at 251–52, 302–05.
187 Id. at 284–85.
188 Id. at 299–301.
189 Id. at 294–95.
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authority of majoritarian institutions.190 If, as discussed above,
that argument fails, then Waldron can only defend the authority
of participatory institutions on the basis of substantive
arguments that will also face significant disagreement.191
Therefore, Waldron cannot consistently argue against the notion
that the entrenchment of rights is a necessary condition for
democratic legitimacy by appealing to the fact of disagreement
unless he also abandons his commitment to the view that the
majority should possess the authority to resolve questions
regarding the nature and extent of individual rights. Since
Waldron maintains his commitment to the latter view, his
objection to entrenched rights as a necessary condition for
democratic legitimacy fails.
E.

Waldron’s Critique V: Precommitment Models the
Entrenchment of Rights Imperfectly

Waldron argues that the notion of precommitment
imperfectly models the entrenchment of rights. In a true case of
precommitment, the agent knows precisely the action she wishes
to avoid.192 For example, Ulysses—who intentionally precommits
to achieve the particular purpose of hearing, but not responding
to, the Sirens—knows that he wishes to avoid responding to the
Sirens’ song.193 However, in a body politic, opinions differ as to
the kind of legislation that rights should preclude. Waldron
emphasizes that these differences of opinion reflect a reasoned
disagreement about the nature and extent of the rights
guarantees that society should recognize.194 Waldron argues that
under such conditions, the entrenchment of rights reflects not
consensual precommitment, but “the artificially sustained
ascendancy of one view in the polity over other views.”195
His argument would be quite persuasive if theorists
such as Jon Elster and Stephen Holmes—both of whom have
developed influential accounts of the precommitment
argument196—argued that the entrenchment of rights constituted
a form of “self-binding,” or the form of precommitment which
See supra Section III.A.
Such substantive arguments would include the claims that (i) respect for
persons requires that decisions about rights claims must be decided by the majority or
its representatives; and (ii) the right to participate must be assigned priority over all
other rights in a democratic form of government. Both arguments are plausible but
highly controversial.
192 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 262.
193 HOMER, supra note 100.
194 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 264.
195 Id. at 268.
196 See ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 99, at 36–111; HOLMES, supra note 22, at 27.
190
191
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involves the intentional adoption of a constraint. Democratic
theory, however, models entrenched rights as a form of
“incidental constraint,” a constraint which does not necessarily
involve intentional “self-binding,” but which nevertheless
produces benefits equivalent to those of “self-binding.”197 Elster’s
and Holmes’s accounts of precommitment are thus descriptive
rather than normative, and offer an explanation of the function
and benefits of a particular social practice, rather than a
justification for its authority.
Waldron’s reference to the artificially sustained
ascendancy of one view in the argument from precommitment
reveals the manner in which his analysis falters. Waldron
views theories of precommitment as an attempt to provide a
normative justification for entrenched rights.198 However, these
theories offer only an account of the function of constitutional
entrenchment as a social practice and of the benefits realized
through such a practice.199 While the identified benefits of
entrenching individual rights do suggest reasons for maintaining
the practice,200 no effort is made to determine the status of these
reasons relative to reasons for abandoning the practice. Therefore,
theories of precommitment do not offer a systematic normative
argument justifying the entrenchment of rights.
In The Core of the Case, Waldron claims that theories of
precommitment have “been thoroughly discredited in the
literature.”201 However, in support of this claim, Waldron only
cites Elster’s recent concession—in Ulysses Unbound202—that
the model of precommitment as “self-binding” fails to provide a
plausible model for entrenched rights.203 The cited passage fails
to support Waldron’s claim, however, since Elster continues to
maintain that the model of precommitment as an “incidental
constraint” remains a valuable and robust analytic tool for
rights theory.204 Elster does not argue that the notion of
precommitment is an inappropriate metaphor for entrenched
rights; rather, he asserts that theories of rights that represent
entrenched rights as a form of precommitment should define
197 HOLMES, supra note 22, at 134–77. The entrenchment of rights, it is
argued, performs an enabling function in making possible the realization of democratic
institutions. Id.
198 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 257–60.
199 See supra Section II.C.
200 See supra Section II.C.
201 Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1393.
202 See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 104, at 36–111; Waldron, The
Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1393.
203 See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 104, at 90–96.
204 Id. at 90.
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the relevant notion of precommitment as a form of “incidental
constraint” instead of a form of “self-binding.”205 Accordingly,
the Elster citation provides no support for Waldron’s claim that
the notion of rights as a form of precommitment is “discredited
in the literature.”206 Since Waldron fails to establish either that
theories of precommitment model entrenched rights imperfectly
or that theories of precommitment have been discredited in the
literature, Waldron’s objection to the model of precommitment’s
account of the entrenchment of rights necessarily fails.
Therefore, Waldron’s critique of judicial review fails to
establish that this practice (a) is inattentive to the right to
have one’s voice count;207 (b) transfers power to an undemocratic
institution;208 (c) fails to take proper account of the good faith
commitment of democratic citizens to respect for rights;209 (d)
underestimates the significance of pluralist objections to the
argument that entrenched rights are a necessary condition of
legitimacy;210 or (e) models the entrenchment of rights inaccurately
as a form of precommitment.211 Waldron’s critique of judicial review
stands or falls with his critique of the constitutional protection of
rights. This section has demonstrated that his critique of the
constitutional protection of rights is unpersuasive,212 and therefore
his critique of judicial review also fails. The next section will set out
a constitutionalist case in favor of judicial review that is responsive
to contemporary critiques.
IV.

THE CORE OF AN UNQUALIFIED CASE FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW: THE CONSTITUTIONALIST CONCEPTION

When does majority support constitute a sufficient basis
for the legitimate exercise of political power? Waldron’s critique
of judicial review is most seriously flawed by its failure to
address this question adequately. Waldron concedes that majority
support does not automatically ensure that an exercise of political
power is legitimate.213 He specifically acknowledges that “[n]o
one thinks that any old bunch of people is entitled to impose a
decision on others, simply on the ground that there are more

205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Id.
Waldron, The Core of the Case, supra note 1, at 1393.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.D.
See supra Section III.E.
See supra Part III.
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 283.
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individuals in favour of the decision than against it.”214
Nevertheless, Waldron denies that the proper extent and limits
of majority power can be a real question for democratic theory.215
When the majority over-reaches by denying suffrage to women
or minorities, Waldron argues, society is simply “left in a
legitimacy-free zone.”216 He concedes that if the majority violates
the necessary conditions of political legitimacy (e.g. by enacting
legislation that invades a minority’s fundamental rights), the
majority forfeits any legitimate claim to a right to exercise
political power and society enters “a legitimacy-free zone.” But
Waldron believes that no democratic institutional arrangements
are available to prevent such abuses. Rather, “the best that we
can hope for is that a legitimate democratic system [re]emerges
somehow or other.”217 According to Waldron’s view, an account of
the institutional arrangements that could prevent abuses of
majority power is simply beyond the scope of democratic theory.218
Yet a theory that takes seriously Waldron’s intuition
that a majority is not “entitled to impose a decision on others,
simply on the ground that there are more individuals in favour
of the decision than against it”219 requires an account of the
relation between majority support and adequate justification
for the legitimate exercise of political power. If the fact that
“there are more individuals in favour of the decision than
against it” is not a sufficient justification for political decisions
in a democracy, this must be because fundamental democratic
commitments exist that a legitimate democracy must respect
even when the majority desires otherwise. However, if this
claim were true, then it would seem that a legitimate democratic
form of government must regulate the influence on social choice
of preferences that are inconsistent with the foundational
commitments of democracy. Only if political institutions perform
such a function will it be possible to “mak[e] sense of the
democratic quality of the popular will.”220 It is therefore implicit
in Waldron’s own view that regulation of the relation between
preferences and the community’s political choices is a
constitutive condition of democracy. In offering an account of the
institutional arrangements necessary to regulate the relation
between preferences and social choice, then, the constitutionalist
Id.
Id. at 300.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 283.
220 Alessandro Ferrara, Of Boats and Principles: Reflections on Habermas’s
“Constitutional Democracy,” 29 POL. THEORY 782, 783 (2001).
214
215
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view is more responsive to the theoretical challenges raised by the
fact of pluralism than the interpretation offered by majoritarians.
This part of the article will provide an account of
constitutionally entrenched rights as institutional features of a
democratic political culture that regulate the relation between
preferences and the community’s political choices. In particular,
it will argue that constitutionally protected rights define the
class of preferences that may appropriately influence social
choice and restrict the political influence of preferences that
persons subject to the coercive power of the state could reasonably
reject as the basis of a political decision. If this analysis is
persuasive, then the enforcement of these rights through judicial
review is a practice that is essential to democracy.
A.

The Class of Preferences Relevant to Democratic Choice

While democratic institutions should, in principle, be
responsive to preferences, even Waldron’s majoritarian theory
appears to require regulation of the relation between
preferences and the community’s political choices.221 Leading
social choice theorists argue that institutional arrangements
should regulate the influence of certain categories of preferences
on political decisions.222 According to this literature, there are
“reasons, internal to preferences themselves, for disregarding
some sorts of preferences” in the process of social choice.223 The
view that the preferences relevant to social choice are merely the
person’s ranking of various social states, in fact, reflects “an
impoverished conception of individual preferences.”224
An acceptable democratic theory thus requires, as a
central element, an account of institutional features––
“preference filters”225––that regulate the role of preferences in
See supra Part IV (introduction).
See generally ROBERT E. GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter
GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY]; Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 75 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986)
[hereinafter Goodin, Laundering Preferences] (arguing that some preferences may
justifiably be considered inappropriate inputs to the social choice process and may
therefore be filtered out of the social choice process); Amartya Sen, Liberty, Unanimity
and Rights, 43 ECONOMICA 217 (1976) (arguing that rights properly function to restrict
the influence of certain kinds of preferences on social choice); John C. Harsanyi,
Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL.
ECON. 434 (1953) (arguing that genuine value judgments on social welfare are properly
based only on non-egoistic preferences); Bill New, Paternalism and Public Policy, 15
ECON. & PHIL. 63 (1999).
223 Goodin, Laundering Preferences, supra note 222, at 77.
224 Id. at 76.
225 Conventional social choice analysis takes preferences as “given,” without
attempting to examine underlying motivation(s). Preferences can, however, be based on a
221

222
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social decision-making and thus define and regulate the relation
between preferences and legitimate exercises of political power.
Such an account must examine the feasible forms of preference
filter and identify the form that is most consistent with
democratic commitments and concerns. Preference filters may
filter inputs into or outputs out of the process of social choice.226
Input filters exclude certain kinds or classes of preferences
altogether from the political process. For example, an input
filter might exclude from social choice all preferences to deprive
other citizens of basic liberties. Since input filters completely
nullify the influence of such preferences, this form of filter
provides the most comprehensive protection for democratic
commitments.227 This virtue, however, is balanced by the
corresponding vice of excluding a large amount of preference
information from the process of social choice. Output filters, in
contrast, limit only the political effects of certain preferences.228
This form of filter simply removes certain political options from
social consideration, regardless of the degree of preferencebased support the option may have.229 Unlike input filters, then,
output filters allow all preference information to count.
If democratic theory aims to facilitate inclusive political
institutions in which the ability to participate is restricted only
when necessary to ensure free and equal participation by all,
then output filters are more consistent with the aims of
democratic theory than input filters. Entrenched rights, which
prevent the majority from translating certain preferences into
legislation inconsistent with fundamental commitments of
democracy, function as output filters and therefore correspond
to the interpretation of preference filtering that is most
consistent with the aims of democratic theory. Entrenched rights
acting as output filters, in particular, permit all preferences to
affect social choice, but they prevent the majority from
translating certain kinds of preferences—such as racial
wide range of motivations, some of which will be more appropriate as inputs into the social
choice process than others. Self-regarding or malicious motives, for example, may
constitute less appropriate inputs than altruistic or socially constructive motives. Several
approaches to social choice theory propose to limit the preferences permissible as inputs to
social decision-making by scrutinizing motivations. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE,
AND MEASUREMENT 291–326 (The MIT Press ed., 1982); JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 48–86 (1977);
Goodin, Laundering Preferences, supra note 222, at 91–96. According to these approaches,
some preferences may justifiably be considered inappropriate inputs to the social choice
process and may therefore be filtered out of that process.
226 Goodin, Laundering Preferences, supra note 222, at 91–96.
227 See id.
228 See id.
229 See id.
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prejudice—into legislation that overreaches the powers of a
legitimate government—such as legislation enslaving members
of a minority. Thus, entrenched rights functioning as preference
filters serve both the democratic goals of (i) maximal
inclusiveness of preference information, and (ii) free and equal
participation by all.
B.

Filtering Preferences

Rights prevent the majority from translating certain
preferences into legislation. But what criterion is most
appropriate for distinguishing preferences that are consistent
with democratic commitments from those that are not? Dworkin,
in his influential rights theory, provides an important account
(discussed below) of the status of preferences as inputs into
democratic social choice. While certain legal scholars have
criticized Dworkin’s view,230 much of this criticism reflects a
misunderstanding of the aims and structure of Dworkin’s
arguments. Nevertheless, these criticisms raise concerns that
any account of Dworkin’s approach must address. This section
of the article responds to the most powerful objections raised by
his critics and offers an account of the proper relation between
preferences and policy in a democracy.
In early statements of his rights theory,231 Dworkin
argued that preferences are problematic as inputs into
democratic social choice if those preferences (1) aim to secure
disproportionate influence for some person or group, or (2)
reflect a lack of equal respect for other members of society.
While Dworkin argues persuasively that preferences with these
qualities are inconsistent with the commitments of a democratic
culture,232 it seems more plausible to argue that it is the
inadequacy of certain classes of preferences as bases for the
justification of social choice—rather than their tendency to
secure disproportionate influence or to express disrespect for
persons—that justifies the function of rights in filtering the
influence of these preferences.

230 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 221–22
(1983); Joseph Raz, Professor Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123, 123 (1978).
231 See, in particular, DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at
86–90. Dworkin’s rights theory argues that (i) legal controversies should be resolved on
the basis of principle rather than policy; and (ii) legal rights function to prevent certain
kinds of preferences from producing certain kinds of legislation. Id. at 86–90, 235–39,
275–78. The latter claim is discussed at length in this section.
232 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 234–38.
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1. Filtering Preferences Guards Against the
Disproportionate Influence of Any Person or Group
Dworkin argues that in order to ensure that a society’s
political choices assign equal weight to the preferences of all
members of a democratic society, public deliberations regarding
policy should assign critical weight to personal preferences—
preferences that relate to the individual’s realization of his or
her own advantage—and should not assign decisive weight to
external preferences—preferences that relate to the realization
of advantage by other persons.233 An approach that allowed
external preferences to determine policy outcomes in such
cases would fail to treat all persons with equal concern and
respect, since the preferences of persons with effective external
preferences would both (a) promote their own advantage
through the influence of their personal preferences, and (b)
undermine the advantage of others through the influence of
their external preferences. Indeed, Dworkin argues that their
collective preferences would exert a disproportionate effect on
policy.234 Therefore, Dworkin describes the inclusion of such
preferences in social choice as “a form of double counting.”235
To illustrate the practical significance of Dworkin’s
distinction, suppose that all citizens of a southern state in the
Jim Crow era had personal preferences that their children
enjoy the opportunity to attend the state’s university, while
some also had external preferences that children from minority
families should be denied that opportunity. Suppose, in addition,
that the state legislature—on the basis only of the external
preferences—enacted legislation barring minority students from
attending the university. According to Dworkin’s argument, a
court considering the constitutionality of the legislation should
assign no weight to the fact that the legislation satisfied the
external preferences of members of the community. Assigning
weight to such preferences, he argues, would give the holders of
external preferences a disproportionate influence over the
legislative process. If the legislation was enacted only to satisfy
external preferences, then the fact that the legislation was the
output of a duly constituted legislature should therefore be
assigned minimal weight by the court. Rather, if the only
argument in favor of the legislation was that it satisfied external

233
234
235

Id. at 232–38, 276–78.
Id. at 232–38, 276.
Id. at 235.
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preferences, the court should have no hesitation in striking the
legislation as inconsistent with equal protection under the law.
Dworkin’s distinction between external and personal
preferences establishes a clear boundary between preferences
that may legitimately determine the output of democratic
social choice and those that may not. Moreover, Dworkin’s
approach locates the justification for filtering preferences
directly in the failure of holders of objectionable preferences to
respect the equal right of each person to pursue his or her
ends.236 Furthermore, as H.L.A. Hart notes,237 Dworkin’s approach
provides the basis for a sympathetic reconstruction of
utilitarianism with the potential to reconcile that theory with the
liberal tradition by incorporating liberal intuitions regarding the
inviolability of fundamental rights.238 Despite these attractive
theoretical qualities, both H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz reject
Dworkin’s account of the relative merits of internal and external
preferences as determinants of social choice.239 In particular,
both Hart and Raz assert that no preference is counted twice
when a political system gives effect to external preferences;240
and Dworkin’s argument does not establish that all external
preferences are inappropriate inputs into political justification.241 If
Hart and Raz were correct in arguing that the influence of external
preferences on policy does not constitute double-counting, that
conclusion would seriously undermine Dworkin’s account of the
function and justification of political and legal rights.
2. Filtering External Preferences Prevents Double
Counting
As Hart and Raz interpret his argument, Dworkin
recommends filtering external preferences in order to address a
procedural defect of majoritarian voting.242 In this interpretation
of Dworkin’s view, counting external preferences corrupts
Id. at 234–36.
Hart’s positivist theory of law profoundly influenced the development of
Dworkin’s legal theory. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012). Unlike
Dworkin, however, Hart is a utilitarian and a consequentialist.
238 HART, supra note 230, at 211–13. Note that, as discussed supra Part I,
Rawls argues that the defining feature of classical utilitarianism is its disregard for the
fundamental interests of individuals and groups, and in particular its disregard for
individual rights.
239 HART, supra note 230, at 220–21; Raz, supra note 230, at 131.
240 HART, supra note 230, at 221; Raz, supra note 230, at 131. The specific
content of these objections is discussed infra Section IV.B.2.
241 HART, supra note 230, at 221; Raz, supra note 230, at 131–32. The specific
content of this argument is discussed infra Section IV.B.2.
242 See supra Section IV.B.1.
236
237
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majoritarian voting procedures by assigning twice as much
power to influence outcomes to persons with both external and
personal preferences as it assigns to persons with only personal
preferences.243 Hart and Raz argue that this claim is false.244 A
social decision procedure that admits votes based upon both
external and personal preferences assigns precisely the same
weight to each preference, and each preference counts only
once.245 The fact that some people have only personal preferences
does not mean that they are treated unequally when votes
reflecting the external preferences of others are counted.246
Indeed, Hart argues that when external preferences are
decisive in the vote of a majority to curtail the rights of the
minority, the minority’s problem is not that they are treated
unequally but that they “are too few.”247 Accordingly, Hart and
Raz conclude that Dworkin’s claim that counting external
preferences involves double counting fails.248
While this objection would be decisive if Dworkin, in
fact, claimed that counting external preferences constituted
merely a procedural defect of majoritarian voting procedures,
Dworkin’s argument does not aim to diagnose these procedural
flaws. Rather, Dworkin examines the manner in which the
community and its legislators take the preferences of its
members into consideration in justifying the community’s policy
decisions.249 Suppose, for example, that a state legislature enacts
legislation denying certain opportunities to minorities, as Texas
state law in the 1940s denied to racial minorities the opportunity
to attend the state’s law school.250 If the law were challenged in
court, advocates of the legislation could attempt to justify it by
arguing that the legislation satisfies the collective preferences
of members of the state better than an alternate policy. However,
Dworkin argues that if (a) members of both the majority and
minority have personal preferences that members of their group
should have the opportunity to attend the law school; (b)
members of the majority also have external preferences that
minority members should be excluded; and (c) the claim that
enactment of the legislation satisfies the collective preferences
of members of the community is true only if the majority’s
See supra Section IV.B.1.
HART, supra note 230, at 220–21; Raz, supra note 230, at 131.
245 HART, supra note 230, at 220–21; Raz, supra note 230, at 131.
246 Raz, supra note 230, at 131.
247 HART, supra note 230, at 217.
248 Id. at 216–19.
249 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 232–38.
250 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631, 636 (1950); DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 223, 229–39.
243
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external preferences are made decisive; then (d) the legislation
would grant disproportionate influence to holders of external
preferences, and would therefore fail to treat all members of
the state with equal concern and respect.251 Therefore, in such a
case, the claim that the legislation satisfied the collective
preferences of members of the community could not justify the
enactment of the legislation. Dworkin’s argument thus focuses
on the weight to be assigned to preference inputs in the
justification of policy, and not on the procedural fairness of
majoritarian institutions. Hart and Raz therefore fail to provide
persuasive objections to Dworkin’s account of the function and
justification of political and legal rights.
3. External Preferences Should Not Be Decisive in the
Justification of Law
Hart and Raz argue that Dworkin’s argument establishes,
at most, that external preferences reflecting disrespect or
prejudice are inappropriate inputs into social choice, and not that
social choice must restrict the influence of all external
preferences.252 Consider, Hart suggests, the case of external
preferences favorable to other persons or groups—for example,
the preference of heterosexuals that homosexual relationships
should enjoy the same legal protections as heterosexual ones.253
If the passage of legislation securing this result were realized on
the basis of votes reflecting external preferences (preferences of
heterosexuals about the pursuit of advantage by homosexuals),
it would be implausible to suggest that the holders of those
preferences had exercised disproportionate influence on social
choice. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to exclude external
preferences from social choice in such a case on the grounds that
their inclusion would confer disproportionate political influence.
But if external preferences are valid inputs into social choice, as
Hart concludes, then Dworkin cannot sustain the general claim
that external preferences are inappropriate inputs into social
choice.254
However, Dworkin does not make the general claim that
Hart attributes to him. Dworkin argues only that external
preferences should not exercise decisive weight in justifying
legislation that would put persons at a disadvantage,255 and not
251
252
253
254
255

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 232–35.
HART, supra note 230, at 221; Raz, supra note 230, at 131.
HART, supra note 230, at 216.
Id. at 218–19.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 232–36.
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that external preferences should be excluded generally from
social choice. Therefore, Dworkin would agree with Hart that the
external preferences of heterosexuals to enact legal protections
for homosexuals are legitimate inputs into social choice. Hart’s
argument thus fails to provide a persuasive objection to Dworkin’s
argument that it is the proper function of political and legal rights
to neutralize the influence of external preferences on legislation
that affects citizens’ fundamental interests.
4. Filtering External Preferences Is Justified by a
Reasonable Rejection Standard of Justification
Even if it is conceded that Dworkin is correct in arguing
that political and legal rights are designed to restrict the
influence of external preferences on social choice––as Raz
argues––Dworkin’s account inaccurately describes the defect
that justifies excluding preferences from social choice.256 The
preferences of residents of Texas to exclude blacks from their state
law school are offensive, not because they exert disproportionate
influence on policy, but because they are inconsistent with respect
for persons.257 It is the disrespectful quality of the preferences—
and not their external character—that disqualifies them from
social choice. Raz claims that Dworkin describes this
objectionable character more accurately when he digresses from
his discussion of disproportionate influence to note that
persons disadvantaged by such preferences would be deprived of
liberties and opportunities precisely because the community views
the consequences of a collective decision for such persons as less
important than the consequences for others.258
While Dworkin appears to have accepted this criticism,259
Raz’s argument is far from dispositive. It is possible, while
sharing the view that preferences reflecting disrespect for other
members of society should not exercise decisive weight in collective
social decisions, to resist the argument that such preferences are
objectionable because they manifest disrespect. Such preferences
often reflect benevolent but misguided paternalism. For example,
Raz, supra note 230, at 131.
See id.; see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (striking down a
Texas state law excluding black students from the state law school).
258 Persons disadvantaged by such preferences would suffer lesser life chances
precisely because “they are thought less worthy of concern and respect than others
are.” DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 275.
259 In more recent writings, he argues that an adequate system of rights
“prohibits legislation that could be justified only by counting, within the overall
calculation determining where the general interest lies, preferences directly or indirectly
arising from prejudice.” DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 51, at 385.
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Joshua Cohen notes that the Catholic doctrine forbidding
homosexuality appears to be motivated—at least in part—by
concern for the moral health of all members of the community,
and not by a failure of equal concern and respect.260
While preferences that reflect a failure of respect for
persons are objectionable, their offensiveness is merely a special
case of a more general kind of defect. As in the case of
paternalistic preferences favoring antihomosexual legislation,
disrespectful preferences are an unacceptable basis for the
justification of exercises of collective power because persons
subject to that power could reasonably reject a justification that
relied upon such preferences.261 Therefore, the defect in the
preferences to be excluded is located in their quality as
unacceptable bases for a justification, not in the motivations of
the legislators.262
According to this view, preferences inconsistent with the
commitments of democracy are those preferences that persons
subject to the exercise of collective political power could
reasonably reject as the basis of a political decision. According
to this argument, then, the criterion that identifies preferences
consistent with fundamental democratic commitments derives
from the contractualist moral framework that constitutes the
normative core of modern accounts of legitimacy, political
authority, and representative government.263 The standard of
justification for moral judgments in this tradition (as T.M.
Scanlon argues in his central account of contractualist moral
theory)264 is the standard of reasonable rejectability: no moral
principle can be viewed as justified if the principle could
reasonably be rejected by persons who may be affected by the
application of that principle.265
Consistent with the view defended in this article, rights
theory applies a version of this contractualist standard in
assessing the appropriate role of preferences in the process of
Cohen, Democracy, supra note 23, at 215.
Id. at 206.
262 Id. at 222.
263 Since this view asserts that only preferences that could reasonably be
accepted by all affected persons on their own terms are legitimate inputs into social
choice, this view is entirely equivalent to the contractarian view that acceptable terms of
social cooperation are those that could be unanimously accepted by free and equal
persons under fair conditions. See PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 125,
163 (1982) for a helpful account of the role of ideas of social contract in the modern
political tradition.
264 T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 189 (1998).
265 Id. at 195. Brettschneider argues that a contractualist justification of
democracy constitutes the core of Rousseau’s account of “the people as the source of
sovereignty.” BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 56–57.
260
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democratic social choice. Under this standard, no preference
can be viewed as providing a reason for the adoption of
legislation if other persons subject to the political power of the
legislature could reasonably reject that legislation. In
highlighting the significance of the power of reasonable rejection
for individuals who are subject to the collective political power of
the state, Scanlon’s contractualist theory suggests that
Waldron’s attempt to generate a theory that fully respects the
diversity of beliefs regarding the good may overlook important
considerations. While Waldron argues that it is disrespectful
for a political process to entrench rules that limit the power of
the majority, it is arguably at least equally disrespectful for a
community to subject persons to burdensome policies that
those persons could reasonably reject. The contractualist view
suggests that limits on the power of the majority are required
precisely in order to show adequate respect for holders of
pluralistically diverse conceptions of the good. Ironically, while
majoritarians argue that entrenched rights are inconsistent
with respect for pluralistic disagreement, it is precisely the
respect for such disagreement that requires entrenched rights
to filter the output of social choice.
C.

Justifying the Constitutionalist Conception of Judicial
Review

It is the goal of creating a political context in which the
will of the majority can exercise authority in a manner consistent
with respect for pluralistic disagreement that requires an account
of the relation between preferences and democratic decisionmaking that places justification at the center of its account of
democracy. The constitutional conception argues that an
acceptable account of this relation will be grounded in the notion
that legitimate exercises of political power must be justified on
terms that are at least acceptable to all affected persons.266
Only when the bases of collective decisions are at least acceptable
to all affected persons are all members of society included as
equal members in the collective process of social choice.267
Waldron resists this conclusion because he claims that an
approach that places justification centrally, while possibly
appropriate for working out an account of justice, is problematic
“as a way of thinking about politics.”268 He notes that politics
See Cohen, Democracy, supra note 23, at 222–23.
Id.
268 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 3, at 159. Waldron, that is,
argues against approaches to legal reasoning that would consider the fact that an
266
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necessarily involves decisions reached despite the fact that
participants “disagree about the values and principles that the
merits of those issues engage.”269 In other words, Waldron argues
that an approach that places justification centrally will require
the kind of agreement regarding values that politics lacks.270
The constitutional conception’s central focus on
justification, however, is necessary precisely to address the
problem of pluralistic disagreement that Waldron emphasizes.
Waldron’s theory addresses this problem by guaranteeing to all
citizens the right to participate and then subjecting all persons
to the majority’s will.271 Yet it seems reasonable to conclude
that institutions fail to show adequate respect for the personal
commitments of pluralistically disagreeing persons when those
institutions merely guarantee to minorities the right to vote
and express their views but simultaneously fail to protect those
minorities against interference by the majority with their
fundamental interests. For example, suppose that that a political
process guaranteed to members of a homosexual minority the
right to participate in political deliberation, but accepted—as
legitimate output of that deliberation—legislation that
criminalized homosexual relationships. Would such a political
process show adequate respect for the views of the homosexual
minority? The short answer is “no.” Such a political process would
improperly privilege the ability to express views over the ability to
act on those views.
Therefore, the constitutionalist view offers a more
ambitious interpretation of the idea of respect for pluralistic
disagreement than the majoritarian view. Unlike the majoritarian
view, the constitutionalist view respects the individual’s interest in
pursuing her conception of the good by protecting that interest
from interference by the majority.272 The requirement that
legitimate exercises of political power must be justified on terms
acceptable to all affected persons prevents collective decisions
from justifying disrespectful or paternalistic legislation that
would interfere with the individual’s right to pursue his or her
own conception of the good. Entrenched rights then implement this
requirement by protecting individuals and groups from legislative
enactments that could not be justified to all affected persons.

enactment was unjustifiable to be a powerful objection to the authority of legislation
authorized by the majority or their representatives.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 See supra Part III.
272 See supra Section II.A.
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However, it could be argued that the costs to democracy
of entrenching rights may be unacceptably high, despite the
function that entrenched rights perform in securing respect for
pluralistic disagreement.273 James Bohman, a leading advocate
of this position, argues that important aspects of the
constitutional conception have the effect of excluding dissenters
from public discourse.274 In particular, Bohman criticizes the
requirement that certain kinds of preferences may not count as
reasons justifying the exercise of political power.275 He argues
that this aspect of the constitutional conception is unacceptable,
as social choice in a democracy is justified on the basis of appeals
to multiple values.276 In the context of democratic deliberation,
he asserts that no single value may properly be assigned priority
as a ground of democratic legitimacy.277 Bohman claims that the
constitutional conception improperly privileges a single value—
reciprocity—to justify political arrangements that will have the
effect of suppressing dissent that appeals to other values to
ground its objections.278 Bohman concludes that a more
acceptable response to dissent would be to place it at the center
of democratic debate.279
This argument, however, assumes that entrenched
rights exclude the input of persons whose preferences are
inconsistent with foundational democratic commitments from
democratic social choice. As discussed above,280 entrenched
rights permit all preference information to enter the process of
social choice and operate only to prevent that preference input
from justifying certain kinds of policy output. Therefore, under
a system that includes entrenched rights, the preferences of every
person subject to exercises of political power are incorporated in
the process of social choice. Under such an approach, dissent can
and should be placed at the center of democratic debate.
Entrenched rights merely prevent preference inputs
from justifying political decisions that impose disadvantage in
ways that could not be justified to all affected persons on terms
that they could reasonably accept.281 Rather than improperly
273 James Bohman, Deliberative Toleration, 31 POL. THEORY 757, 759, 761–79
(2003); Bonnie Honig, Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas’s “Constitutional
Democracy,” 29 POL. THEORY 792, 797 (2001); CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC
PARADOX 83–105 (2000).
274 Bohman, supra note 273, at 757, 759, 761–75.
275 Id. at 768.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 See supra Section IV.A.
281 See supra Section II.A.
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restricting the content of legitimate democratic debate, the
enforcement of entrenched rights through judicial review
preserves its democratic character. If, as majoritarians argue,
“the main question for democratic politics is . . . how to
constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic
values,”282 democratic politics should assign the highest priority
to the preservation and implementation of entrenched rights.
CONCLUSION
Waldron argues that judicial review lacks legitimacy
because constitutionally protected rights do not provide a
legitimate basis for judicial restraint over the power of the
majority.283 He argues that in a democracy, the will of the
majority must have the final say regarding the nature and extent
of rights protections.284 Arguments for the priority of rights,
Waldron insists, are insufficiently respectful of the conceptions of
the good held by diverse persons in a pluralistic society.285
This article argues that Waldron’s case against judicial
review fails because its notion of respect for pluralistic
disagreement lacks both ambition and imagination. Respect for
disagreement requires more than a guarantee of participation
in the political process.286 An approach that guarantees the
right to participate, but allows the majority to disenfranchise
or seriously compromise the rights of a minority, improperly
privileges the ability to express views over the ability to act on
those views.287 A more balanced approach would recognize the
will of the majority as a basis for legitimate legislation only
when that will reflects preferences that constitute legitimate
inputs into social choice. Such preferences respect commitments
arising under each individual’s conception of the good, and can
therefore be justified to all persons who are subject to exercises
of collective power on terms that those persons can accept.288 An
approach that fails to define the relation between majority
support and the exercise of legitimate political power in this
way shows serious disrespect for minorities whenever it subjects
members of minorities to burdensome policies that the affected
persons could reasonably reject.289 Waldron’s case against judicial
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

MOUFFE, supra note 273, at 100.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.C.
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review thus fails because of its very limited understanding of
what respect for disagreement actually entails.

